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Plurality Decisions:  Upward-Flowing Precedent and 
Acoustic Separation  
JUSTIN MARCEAU 
Beginning in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed lawyers and lower 
courts that when there is no majority decision “in support of the judgment . . . , the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”  For decades, 
commentators and judges alike have vocally lamented the opaque and seemingly 
intractable nature of this instruction, known as the Marks rule.  The usual 
academic trope in this field consists of a discussion of a recent plurality decision, 
followed by an account of how difficult it is to discern the narrowest grounds for 
that decision, and concluding with a statement about how the lack of clarity as to 
the relevant precedent impedes the Court’s lawmaking function and diminishes the 
Court’s credibility with the public.  By contrast, this Article provides a new 
framework for understanding plurality precedent.  Rather than emphasizing the 
problems presented by uncertain precedent under the narrowest grounds test, this 
Article highlights the effectiveness of the rule in simultaneously maintaining 
judicial credibility with the public while facilitating flexibility for lower court 
judges.  That is to say, this Article celebrates the Marks rule’s success in 
establishing an acoustic separation between the rule as it is transmitted to lower 
court judges, and the rule as it is understood by the public.  The external message 
reassures society that there has been no breakdown in the judicial process when a 
plurality occurs, and the internal, decisional rule is that in the absence of lower 
court consensus, there is no plurality precedent.  In short, Marks effectively 
reconciles the competing interests of public legitimacy and legal flexibility.
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Plurality Decisions:  Upward-Flowing Precedent and 
Acoustic Separation 
JUSTIN MARCEAU

 
 “Freedom slowly broadens down/From precedent to precedent.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As a general matter, law students are told that they should proceed 
with caution in applying the reasoning of a capital case to a non-capital 
setting,
2
 and likewise they are often advised that substantial care is 
required when one attempts to discern a general principle from a plurality 
decision.
3
  Moreover, at least one U.S. Court of Appeals has suggested that 
“footnotes and other marginalia” in United States Supreme Court opinions 
should not be unduly relied upon.
4
  Remarkably, the Supreme Court’s rule 
for discerning precedent from plurality decisions was born out of a process 
that simultaneously violates all three of these principles.   
The so-called Marks rule, named after the 1977 decision in Marks v. 
United States,
5
 purports to provide the definitive approach for treating non-
majority decisions of the Supreme Court as fully precedential.
6
  Notably, 
however, the Marks rule has its origins in a footnote to the Court’s 1976 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia
7
 interpreting its 1972 decision in Furman v. 
                                                                                                                          
 Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  I am indebted to the cast of 
great junior faculty at the University of Denver for their excellent comments and feedback.  In 
particular, Rebecca Aviel, Alan Chen, Ian Farrell, Nancy Leong, Sam Kamin, and Justin Pidot provided 
thoughtful comments and inspiration.  I am also grateful to Hermine Kallman, Class of 2012, and Neal 
McConomy, Class of 2013, for outstanding research and editing assistance. 
1 Alfred, Lord Tennyson, You Ask Me, Why, Tho’ Ill at Ease, reprinted in THE POETICAL WORKS 
OF TENNYSON 60 (Cambridge ed. 1974) (1842) (quoted in HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS (1912) (acknowledgements page)). 
2 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“The need for treating each defendant in a 
capital case with that degree of . . . uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in 
noncapital cases.”). 
3 See, e.g., Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: 
Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 261–62 (2000) (“[T]he 
discernment of a ratio decidendi from a plurality opinion . . . is more problematic.”). 
4 Jack L. Landau, Footnote Folly: A History of Citation Creep in the Law, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov. 
2006, at 19, 24 (citing Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d 
Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977)). 
5 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
6 Id. at 193. 
7 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion).  In Gregg, Justice Stewart wrote an opinion 
announcing the judgment that was joined by Justices Powell and Stevens.  Id. at 154.  Gregg is often 
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Georgia.
8
  That is to say, the now familiar Marks rule
9
 formula for 
discerning precedent from a plurality decision is rooted in a footnote to a 
plurality decision capital case interpreting a plurality decision capital 
case.  With Gregg and Furman standing as some of the longest and most 
undecipherable decisions in the Court’s history, if there is any sense of 
Karmic justice in constitutional interpretation, a doctrine born out of a 
footnote in Gregg interpreting Furman seemed destined to produce 
intractability and obfuscation.  It has done just that.  One of the purposes of 
this Article is to develop the claim that such indeterminacy of 
interpretation actually has salutatory effects.  
In Marks, the Court instructed lawyers and lower courts that when 
there is no majority decision in support of the judgment, “the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest grounds.”10  This holding 
purports to provide two key rules: (1) plurality decisions generate 
precedent; and (2) the narrowest opinion is the holding.
11
  For anyone who 
has attempted to discern a narrowest ground, however, the difficulty with 
this seemingly straightforward instruction cannot be overlooked.  
Consequently, for decades, commentators and judges alike have vocally 
lamented the opacity of this instruction.
12
  The indeterminacy of plurality 
precedent is, according to the conventional wisdom, cause for serious 
concern.  Indeed, the usual academic trope in this field consists of a 
discussion of a recent plurality decision, followed by an account of how 
difficult it is to discern the narrowest grounds for that decision, and 
concluding with a statement about how the lack of clarity as to the relevant 
precedent impedes the Court’s lawmaking function and diminishes the 
Court’s credibility with the public.13  As a group of political scientists 
                                                                                                                          
cited for a general proposition without any pincite indicating which opinion is binding.  See, e.g., 
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (“[D]eath penalty statutes [must] be structured so as to 
prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.” (citations 
omitted)).  Or, judges might cite Gregg for the general proposition that the death penalty is not per se 
unconstitutional.  See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (“We begin with the principle, settled by 
Gregg, that capital punishment is constitutional.  It necessarily follows that there must be a means of 
carrying it out.” (citations omitted)). 
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
9 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193. 
10 Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (plurality opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens)). 
11 Id. 
12 See, e.g., Pamela C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the 
United States Supreme Court, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 180, 181 (2010) (“[P]lurality decisions do not 
necessarily provide clear guidance to lower courts.”). 
13 See, e.g., Berkolow, Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony 
of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 299, 348 (2008) 
(“[T]he lack of a clear majority rule sends a signal that courts and policy-makers must reevaluate 
existing rules and laws when there is no definitive interpretation from the Supreme Court.”); John F. 
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recently described the phenomena, plurality decisions “arguably result[] in 
the erosion of the Court’s credibility and authority as a source of legal 
leadership.”14  The lack of a clear, binding holding is said to undermine 
confidence in the Court’s legal power and authority.15 
Having thus cast non-majority decisions and the narrowest grounds 
test as a fundamental “breakdown in the judicial decisionmaking process”16 
best avoided, scholars have focused their research efforts on cataloguing 
and explaining the potential causes of plurality decisions.
17
  The most 
recent work in this field empirically tested various “explanations for how 
the Court fails to produce a majority decision.”18   
Breaking ranks with previous scholarship on Marks, this Article 
develops the claim that such ambiguity, and even obfuscation, as to the 
decisional rules might be both necessary and desirable.  Accordingly, this 
Article is not concerned with how or why pluralities occur, but instead 
with the question of what signal they send to the public and to lower 
courts.  More to the point, this Article rejects the negative characterization 
of Marks by offering an alternative framework for understanding plurality 
precedent.  Specifically, the argument is developed that under the theory of 
acoustic separation,
19
 the failure of the Marks rule to actually establish 
clear and mechanically ascertainable precedent, despite claiming to do so, 
is the rule’s greatest triumph.  The Court has generated a rule that ascribes 
to the Court’s most fractured and unintelligible decisions the illusion of 
success; it is as though a failure by the Court to resolve an issue is not 
actually a failure.  The external rule, then, is that there is a narrowest 
ground and that this is something that lawyers and lower courts with their 
technical skills can ascertain, even if the layperson cannot.  The internal 
rule, or the rule directed to the lawyers and lower courts, however, is quite 
                                                                                                                          
Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 
DUKE L.J. 59, 86 (1974) (stressing the “evil inherent” in plurality decisions for the development of the 
law); Douglas J. Whaley, Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-Majority Judicial 
Decisions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 370, 370 (1968) (emphasizing that plurality decisions create havoc for the 
rule of law and the judicial system).    
14  Corley et al., supra note 12, at 183. 
15 Id. at 197. 
16 Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. 
L. REV. 756, 759 (1980). 
17 See, e.g., Corley et al., supra note 12, at 183–95 (explaining why plurality decisions occur 
through an empirical study and concluding, among other things, that the subject matter of the case is a 
strong predictor as to the likelihood of a plurality); James F. Spriggs II & David R. Stras, Explaining 
Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 533–43 (2011) (identifying factors that contribute to plurality 
opinions, such as ideological, collegial, legal, and contextual factors). 
18 Corley et al., supra note 12, at 192. 
19 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625 (1984) [hereinafter Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation] (developing the 
concept of acoustic separation in law, based on the idea that “a distinction can be drawn in the law 
between rules addressed to the general public and rules addressed to officials”). 
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different.  As developed in this Article, through its own handling of 
plurality precedent under the Marks rule, the Court has signaled to lower 
courts that, ultimately, the Marks rule is less a device for divining clear 
precedent and more profitably viewed as an invitation for a referendum 
among the lower courts on the statutory or constitutional question at issue.  
Equally important, lower courts seem to have received and adopted this 
message.  In short, this Article advances the literature on plurality opinions 
by identifying public legitimacy and legal flexibility as competing interests 
in this realm, and recognizing that the Marks rule may be capable of 
reconciling these interests through a sort of sleight of hand or acoustic 
separation.  Although the Supreme Court continues to recite the Marks rule 
as though it is a talismanic cure for plurality decisions, the reality appears 
to be much different.  Indeed, an examination of the cases in which the 
Court actually interprets its own plurality decisions suggests that precedent 
in this realm actually flows upward—that is, the Supreme Court’s plurality 
decisions signal a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to tolerate 
lower court experimentation and development as to the critical questions 
that divided the Supreme Court.   
The Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part II provides an introduction to 
the theory of acoustic separation or internal versus external legal rules, and 
develops the claim that the Marks rule is well-suited to be regarded as a 
success under such theories.  Part III is a brief history of plurality decisions 
and the Court’s evolving understanding of their precedential value, 
including an original taxonomy of the various types of fractured plurality 
decisions that can arise.  Next, in Part IV, every case in which the Supreme 
Court purports to apply or consider its own Marks rule is analyzed and the 
claim that the Marks rule represents a successful instance of acoustic 
separation is developed by, among other things, proving that precedent in 
this arena tends to flow upward—from lower courts to the Supreme Court.  
And finally, Part V considers the functioning of the Marks doctrine in the 
lower federal courts, and observes that many lower courts appear to have 
received the tacit message sent by the Supreme Court regarding plurality 
precedent, to wit, that it is not actually binding in any conventional sense.  
The lower courts considering Marks have concluded that a confusing rule 
that is rarely applied in a consistent manner—even if that rule comes from 
the Supreme Court—retains only minimal force in our precedential system.  
As it applies to lower courts, then, the Marks rule for discerning precedent 
does not, as a practical matter, enjoy the status of binding precedent.
20
     
                                                                                                                          
20 There is, of course, room to criticize this view of the Marks rule as tautological—that is, if 
lower courts refuse to follow a precedent, then, of course, it is not precedential.  As a general rule, 
however, the lower courts firmly and consistently apply Supreme Court holdings, and where they fail to 
do so, the Supreme Court eventually intervenes.  In his 1912 Treatise, Henry Campbell Black 
summarized the American model of precedent: “If the decision cited to a court is one which it is 
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II.  ACOUSTIC SEPARATION AND PLURALITY DECISIONS 
The existence and the rise of pluralities seems an inescapable reality 
for the modern Court.
21
  It must be conceded that there is no perfect way to 
manufacture a holding from a non-majority decision—that is, there is no 
single rule that would designate one opinion or another as binding 
precedent that has a more compelling claim of legitimacy than the Marks 
rule.
22
  Viewed in this light, both judicial inertia in favor of existing rules 
and, more importantly, the theory of acoustic separation tip the scales in 
favor of retaining the much maligned Marks doctrine.   
Acoustic separation is a conception of the law developed by Meir 
Dan-Cohen that argues that a law should be understood as providing two 
types of rules: (1) “conduct rules,” which shape and inform public behavior 
and perception; and (2) “decision rules,” which provide normative 
guidance to the courts as decision makers.
23
  According to legal scholar 
Dan-Cohen, these two types of rules have substantial independence, and it 
is suggested that such independence might be a desirable feature of an 
optimally functioning legal framework.
24
  However, critical to this theory 
is the recognition that if the conduct rules governing the public and the 
decisional rules governing judges are to be truly independent in their 
message, then there must be a separate message for the public as opposed 
to the judges—that is, there must be acoustic separation.25 
                                                                                                                          
imperatively bound to follow, no criticism of it as an authority is either proper or permissible.”  HENRY 
CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 81 (1912). 
21 See Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519 (“Historically, plurality decisions by the Supreme 
Court have been relatively rare: during the 145 Terms between 1801 and 1955, the Supreme Court 
issued only 45 plurality decisions.  However, during the 54 Terms from 1953 to 2006, the Supreme 
Court issued 195 plurality opinions, approximately 3.4% of the 5,711 total cases decided during the 
period.” (footnote omitted)); see also Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The 
Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 75 n.62 (1996) (explaining that there 
were “10.3 plurality decisions per Term during the 1980s,” which is an increase from previous 
decades). 
22 There does not appear to be any scholarly or judicial suggestion that an opinion other than that 
deemed controlling under Marks has a stronger claim to the status of binding precedent. 
23 Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 627; see also id. at 628 (“We can 
successfully account for the normative constraints that the law imposes on judicial decisionmaking only 
if we impute to the legal system an additional relevant norm whose norm-subject is the judge and 
whose norm-act is the act of judging or imposing punishment.”).  For a brief but insightful summary of 
Dan-Cohen’s theory, see Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of 
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 311 n.269 (1995). 
24 To be more precise, Dan-Cohen provides examples of the advantageous use of acoustic 
separation, but ultimately concludes that the relationship between a particular conduct rule and a 
decision rule is a “normative issue that must be decided in accordance with the relevant policies and 
values.”  Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 629.   
25 See id. at 635 (“[A]ctual legal systems may in fact avail themselves of the benefits of acoustic 
separation by engaging in ‘selective transmission’—that is, the transmission of different normative 
messages to officials and to the general public, respectively.”). 
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Of course, in the real world there is not true acoustic separation.  
There is no absolute barrier between the norms communicated to the 
judges and the expectations communicated to the public.  Nonetheless, 
Dan-Cohen perceives a form of modified acoustic separation in our legal 
processes.  First, society is divided between the lay public and the 
decision-making judge, and a degree of acoustic separation is said to exist 
“whenever certain normative messages are more likely to register with one 
of the two groups than with the other.”26  In addition, legal systems tend to 
organically develop strategies for selectively transmitting different 
messages to the public and to the decision-making judges by, for example, 
delivering only an incomplete version of the legal rule to the public.
27
   
Accepting that a degree of acoustic separation likely exists in our 
legal system, the natural next question is whether the process of selectively 
transmitting legal information to the public serves only some sinister, anti-
democratic end.  The existence of real-world, quasi or partial acoustic 
separation, according to Dan-Cohen, can serve positive ends.
28
  If the 
decisional rules are communicated too readily to the public, then the 
normative force of some of the conduct rules applicable to the public could 
be undermined.
29
  Acoustic separation will emerge, then, when social 
norms and customs are best served by a decisional rule that differs from its 
corresponding conduct rule.  By way of example, consider the ignorance of 
the law doctrine in criminal law.  As Dan-Cohen points out, courts 
routinely recite the maxim, “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” and 
likewise, the public accepts this as a fundamental legal truth.
30
  Notably, 
however, judges and lawyers recognize that the law in this area is not so 
easily distilled; rather, there are numerous specific exceptions to this 
general principle.
31
  Accordingly, there is acoustic separation built into the 
law in order to produce the socially optimal result—that is, the public will 
be diligent in their efforts to learn the scope of the criminal law, and yet 
judges may be appropriately forgiving of certain mistakes, for example, 
when the mistake of law negates the requisite mens rea.
32
 
                                                                                                                          
26 Id. at 634.   
27 Id. at 635 (“My use of the term should not be understood to connote deliberate, purposeful 
human action.  Imputing to the law strategies of selective transmission does not, therefore, imply a 
conspiracy view of lawmaking in which legislators, judges, and other decisionmakers plot strategies for 
segregating their normative communications more effectively.  Instead, strategies of selective 
transmission may be the kinds of strategies without a strategist that Michel Foucault describes in his 
analysis of power.”). 
28 See id. (mentioning the “benefits of acoustic separation”). 
29 See id. at 632 (“A decision rule conflicts with a conduct rule if the decision rule conveys, as a 
side effect, a normative message that opposes or detracts from the power of the conduct rule.”). 
30 Id. at 645–48. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. at 648 (“[T]he law might try to serve the policies of both the conduct rule and the 
decision rule by . . . attempting to convey to the general public a firm duty to know the law and by 
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Through acoustic separation, therefore, normatively desirable legal 
processes and public behavior are facilitated.  Acoustic separation allows 
for dual legal purposes, which may be in tension, to be simultaneously 
achieved.  Arguably, the Marks rule functions as an invaluable tool of 
acoustic separation, achieving socially desirable ends by facilitating 
distinct rules for the public and the lower courts.
33
   
In the Marks rule context, the external or conduct rule communicated 
to the public is as simple as it is entrenched in American folklore and 
civics.  The Supreme Court is the highest Court of the land, its decisions as 
to questions of federal law are supreme, and its rulings may not be 
challenged or revisited by lower state or federal courts.  The principle that 
is communicated to the public is that, even in the face of a divided, non-
majority decision, the Supreme Court fulfills its duty to create binding 
precedent.  And such a message is likely more important than ever in times 
when the credibility and prestige of the Court is under siege.
34
  Stated at a 
level of generality, then, the conduct rule is that Supreme Court decisions 
create binding precedent and do not represent a breakdown or failure of our 
judicial system.  In this way, the principle of modified acoustic separation 
such that the norms of public behavior are communicated to distinct groups 
through incomplete or imperfect public dissemination can easily be 
discerned in this context.
35
  The external rule of Marks is clear and 
unequivocal: plurality decisions generate precedent.
36
   
In stark contrast to the straightforward, ready for public consumption 
principle that pluralities do not impact the law creating function of the 
Supreme Court, the decision rule born in Marks is masked in 
undecipherable legalese.   The decisional rule, the rule applicable to the 
decision makers tasked with applying Marks, is the “narrowest grounds” 
test, which has the practical effect of affording lower courts with 
substantial flexibility when they are confronted with issues similar to those 
addressed by a plurality decision of the Supreme Court.
37
  Lower court 
judges have come to recognize, as elaborated in Part IV, that the narrowest 
                                                                                                                          
simultaneously instructing decisionmakers to excuse violations in ignorance of the law if fairness so 
required.”). 
33 Dan-Cohen has remarked that it is “not logically necessary for the conduct rule and the decision 
rule, [though] conjoined in a single law, to overlap fully.”  Id. at 649. 
34 See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in Poll, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1 (“Just 44 percent of Americans approve of the job the Supreme Court is 
doing and three-quarters say the justices’ decisions are sometimes influenced by their personal or 
political views.”). 
35 Rules designed to shape the public behavior will often be written in “ordinary language,” but it 
is the “technical” judicial interpretation that may produce the relevant decisional rule.  Dan-Cohen, 
Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 652. 
36 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (rejecting the notion that a plurality decision 
simply fails to create any binding precedent). 
37 Id. 
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grounds formula is an invitation for experimentation and percolation much 
more than it is a doctrine of rigid legal formality.
38
  Accordingly, Marks 
signals to judges and careful observers, but not the general public, the 
acceptability of experimentation and percolation among the lower courts.
39
 
In a nutshell, the Marks rule serves as a beneficial practical 
application of the acoustic separation theory.
40
  For socially divisive issues 
for which there is disagreement among the Justices,
41
 the Marks rule 
achieves two distinct goals that seem irreconcilable in the context of a 
plurality decision: (1) The Marks rule signals to the public a strong, 
reliable, and properly functioning system of judicial review; and (2) it 
simultaneously sends a message to lower courts that they ought to eschew 
notions of rigid unworkable stare decicis in favor of percolation and 
experimentation.  In effect, experimentation that is generally regarded as 
antithetical to federal supremacy and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court 
is permitted without undermining public confidence.
42
  Accordingly, rather 
than emphasizing the problems presented by uncertain precedent under the 
                                                                                                                          
38 See infra Part IV (discussing how the “narrowest grounds” formulation is mostly used as a 
mere utterance before making a particularized assessment of the binding force of a plurality decision on 
lower courts). 
39 Some might recoil at the idea of a judicial doctrine that purports to produce precedent for 
purposes of public appearance, yet fails to do so in any meaningful way.  One might question the 
legitimacy of a precedent premised, at least in part, on deception.  But in defending acoustic separation 
in the context of criminal law, it has been said that “law, like politics, is a power game . . . [and i]n such 
a game, strategic behavior, including bluffing and other forms of deceit, must always be expected,” and 
indeed, should be celebrated if they further societies normative goals.  Dan-Cohen, Acoustic 
Separation, supra note 19, at 677. 
40 This is not an exact application of acoustic separation as envisioned by Dan-Cohen.  In Dan-
Cohen’s imagined legal system, there is separation between the decision maker (the courts) and the 
governed (the public).  Under the Marks form of separation, the courts are aware of both messages; the 
lower courts know of the public rule that pluralities create precedent and they also know of the internal 
rule that provides them flexibility in their decision-making.  Nonetheless, the acoustic separation 
analogy seems valuable; indeed, some of Dan-Cohen’s examples arise in contexts where there is 
incomplete separation such that the decision makers, but not the public, are aware of both the conduct 
and the decisional rules.  See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 646 (applying 
the concept of acoustic separation to the ignorance of the law doctrine and noting that courts recite the 
maxim that ignorance of the law is no defense in order to “reinforce the popular belief that it accurately 
describes the law,” but explaining that the judges themselves recognize that the “maxim, far from being 
an exhaustive statement of the law, is in reality a mere starting point for a complex set of conflicting 
standards and considerations” that permit a fair degree of judicial flexibility).   
41 Studies have shown that pluralities are more likely to arise in the context of politically sensitive 
issues.  Corley et al., supra note 12, at 192 (finding that “controversial, emotionally charged areas of 
law” were the most likely to result in plurality decisions); id. at 193 (“[The] probability of a plurality 
decision also increases by 53 percent if the case involves a politically salient case.”); see also JOEL B. 
GROSSMAN & RICHARD S. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 232 (2d ed. 
1980) (noting that one should not expect Justices “to be united on politically contentious issues that 
divide the country”).   
42 Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 634 (recognizing that without acoustic 
separation, a decisional rule may point “in the opposite direction from, and thus detracts from the force 
of” conduct rules).   
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narrowest grounds test, as has been the norm among judges and academics, 
this Article applauds the effectiveness of the rule in maintaining judicial 
credibility with the public by maintaining a rigid façade of reliable, easily 
discernable precedent, while simultaneously facilitating flexibility for 
lower court judges as to a contentious and unsettled issue.  Building on 
previous scholarship that has recognized a distinction between external and 
internal rules,
43
 or an acoustic separation between legal rules that guide 
“official decisions” and those that guide and shape “public” beliefs and 
decisions,
44
 this Article aims to celebrate the Marks rule for simultaneously 
achieving both functions.  Public legitimacy and legal flexibility, two 
interests that are generally in tension, are simultaneously preserved by the 
Marks rule.  Because of the Marks rule, in precisely those cases where the 
political salience is highest,
45
 the Court is able to communicate to the 
public its interest in engaging with the issue and resolving it, and yet the 
very resolution of the case through a plurality decision will signal to lower 
courts a liberty to experiment with alternative legal rules and approaches.   
In sum, the Marks rule is not the judicial lemon that it is popularly 
believed to be.  It fails as a rigid and readily applied standard, but so in lies 
its success.  There is cause to celebrate the success of the narrowest 
grounds doctrine because of, not in spite of, the cryptic and potentially 
ephemeral value of plurality precedent generated under this rule. The 
Marks rule succeeds in sending a distinct set of “normative messages” to 
both the general public and the judicial decision makers.
46
  The façade of 
mathematically precise precedent flowing from the Court is preserved and 
safeguarded within popular culture, but lower courts and the Supreme 
Court itself are free to view Marks as a minimal or non-existent limit on 
their decisional authority.  For the “legally untutored,” the image of a well 
functioning judiciary reflective of the precedent model of judicial review 
ushered in by the Marshall Court
47
 is maintained, but for the courts, as 
developed in Parts III and IV, it is increasingly clear that the message of 
Marks is one of flexibility and an invitation for innovation.
48
   
                                                                                                                          
43 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 76–
77 (1983) (discussing administrative rule-maker and policymaker use of external and internal rules in 
promulgating rules). 
44 Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 627. 
45 Corley et al., supra note 12, at 193–94 (noting the higher frequency of plurality decisions in 
cases of great political salience). 
46 Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 630; see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (explaining how a divided Court decides a case without any overwhelming rationale that 
explains the nature of the agreement among the majority of Justices). 
47 See infra Part III.A (discussing the history of setting precedent and pluralities stemming from 
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall). 
48 Likewise, to assume that the Court is so feckless as to be unaware of the doctrine’s inability to 
create clear precedent is a mistake.  The Court has likely retained the Marks formulation for more than 
three decades precisely because it achieves the goal of acoustic separation of messaging between the 
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III.  AN OVERVIEW OF PLURALITY DECISIONS 
In order to appreciate the role of acoustic separation in the Marks rule 
context, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of plurality decisions.  
Plurality decisions are not, of course, unanimous decisions of the Court, or 
even bare majority decisions such as 5-4 votes.  A plurality decision is a 
non-majority decision, but not all non-majority decisions are pluralities.  
For example, there are instances where the Court arrives at a 4-4 tie, and 
such decisions are not pluralities.  Illustrative is a decision from 2010 in 
which Justice Stevens did not participate, apparently because he owned 
beachfront land implicated by the case, and the Court split 4-4 as to 
whether the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies so as to limit 
judicial decisions.
49
  Another example of a non-majority decision that is 
not a plurality arises when the Court splits in three or more ways and fails 
to achieve a majority judgment.  For example, if a civil rights action 
resulted in three Justices concluding that no relief was available, three 
Justices voting that only injunctive relief was available, and three Justices 
concluding that only a damages remedy was available, then there might be 
a 3-3-3 split with no majority judgment.
50
  Likewise a split among the 
Justices as between reversing the lower court, remanding to the lower 
court, and affirming the lower court might yield no majority judgment.
51
  
Notably, the Supreme Court recognizes that where the Justices fail to reach 
agreement on a judgment, there is no binding national precedent: the 
affirmance that results from such a tie is conclusive as to the judgment, but 
does not provide for precedent beyond the force of the lower court decision 
that was under review.
52
  Indeed, the general practice is to avoid even 
                                                                                                                          
public and the decision makers that Professor Dan-Cohen famously envisioned.  Dan-Cohen, Acoustic 
Separation, supra note 19, at 630–31 (“[W]e may speak of messages that convey normative 
information . . . and we may distinguish such messages from ones aimed at guiding the decisions of 
officials.”).   
49 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 
(2010) (deciding 8-0 that on the facts of this case, there was no taking); see also Costco Wholesale 
Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (producing a 4-4 split that resulted in an affirmance of the 
lower court’s ruling); Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of New York v. Tom F., 522 U.S. 1, 2 (2007) 
(resulting in a judgment affirmed by an equally divided Court with one Justice taking no part in the 
decision). 
50 Such a non-judgment appears to be purely hypothetical up to this point in the Court’s history, 
perhaps because there is a little known canon of judicial decision making that dictates that at least one 
Justice should change his or her vote whenever necessary in order to obtain a majority judgment.  H. 
Ron Davidson, The Mechanics of Judicial Vote Switching, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 17, 18 (2004) 
(“Every time there has been no majority on the disposition of a case . . . at least one Justice switched 
his or her vote to achieve a majority disposition.”).   
51 Id. at 17–18 & n.5 (noting that Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004), “involves Justices 
divided between four different positions: upholding, overturning, and two different remanding 
positions”). 
52 Michael Gottesman, David Feller, Senior Partner, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 265, 271 
(2003) (“4-4 decisions don’t count, except for the unfortunate petitioner in that case . . . .”).   
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producing any opinions, much less an opinion of the Court, when there is 
no majority judgment. 
By contrast, plurality decisions are properly identified as those 
decisions for which a majority of the Justices agree on the proper outcome 
of the case, but fail to achieve a majority assent as to the proper rationale 
or holding.
53
  In these circumstances, the Supreme Court issues a judgment 
in favor of one party, but it does not issue a majority opinion.  As one 
commentator has put it, “Pluralities announce something like: ‘We agree 
on who wins, but we cannot agree on the role of the Constitution in this 
setting.’”54  The fact of the existence of plurality decisions, however, does 
not dictate that they would produce precedent.   
A.  A Brief History of Precedent and Pluralities 
The problem of Supreme Court plurality precedent is one of the 
externalities of Chief Justice John Marshall’s efforts to enhance the “power 
and prestige” of the Court.55  It is not a natural or necessary conclusion that 
individual cases would do more than resolve the legal dispute before the 
Court.  Indeed, the common law practice was for “all of the participating 
judges to write, and deliver orally, individual opinions explaining their 
views on a case.”56  Initially, “the only opinions the Court issued were oral 
ones, which the court reporter would transcribe and eventually publish.”57  
Upon becoming the fourth Chief Justice in 1801, John Marshall quickly 
ushered an end to the age of seriatim opinion writing for the Supreme 
Court, a practice that Justice Marshall thought undermined confidence in 
the Court’s judgment.58  During the pre-Marshall age, then, the problem of 
                                                                                                                          
53 Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 517 (“Plurality decisions occur when a majority of Justices 
agree upon the result or judgment in a case but fail to agree upon a single rationale in support of the 
judgment.”).   
54 Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 134 (1994). 
55 SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 20 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 
1998) [hereinafter SERIATIM] (quoting HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 199 (6th ed., 
1993)); see also Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, 
and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 165–67 nn. 23–33 (compiling the historical citations on 
this topic of Justice Marshall’s attempt to enhance the Court).     
56 SERIATIM, supra note 55, at 20; see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) 
(describing seriatim in the context of punishing crimes for which there are existing laws); Karl M. 
ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL 
L.Q. 186, 192 (1959) (noting that although “opinions ‘by the Court’ appeared whenever the matter 
could be disposed of with a memorandum, seriatim opinions were always filed in important cases”).   
57 Christopher W. Schmidt & Carolyn Shapiro, Oral Dissenting on the Supreme Court, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 89 (2010). 
58 See John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790–
1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 143–52 (1999) (providing a lucid summary of the history of the early 
Court under John Marshall, and stating that by the end of Justice Marshall’s term, the practice of 
opinions being “nearly always delivered by one Justice speaking for the Court”).  It seems that there 
were opinions of the Court from 1789 through 1801 when Marshall became Chief Justice, although 
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defining the binding precedent of a decision was non-existent insofar as 
there was no expectation that the Justices shared a unifying rationale in 
support of judgment; no single opinion represented the views of the Court, 
and instead each Justice largely spoke for himself.
59
  It was during this new 
era in which the Court spoke with one voice through an “opinion of the 
Court,”60 an opinion that in the early years was “almost always” signed by 
Chief Justice Marshall himself, that the notions of precedent and stare 
decisis were born.
61
  Under the “opinion of the Court” model of judicial 
decision making, a decision joined by a majority of the Justices is imbued 
with the authority of the Court, and after Marbury v. Madison,
62
 with the 
authority of the Constitution itself.
63
  Accordingly, whatever virtues the 
precedent model provided in terms of enhancing the power and credibility 
of the Court, it also made possible the problem of pluralities.  Although a 
decision without a discernable holding was the norm prior to Marshall’s 
Court, once seriatim decisions were replaced with a system of binding 
precedent, a fractured, seriatim-esque decision was an invitation for the 
very sort of interpretive problems that courts and lawyers now experience 
in the realm of plurality decisions.   
To be sure, the precedent model of Supreme Court decision making is 
one of Chief Justice Marshall’s legacies that lives on as one of the 
hallmarks of the Court’s prestige and power, but the unanimity of judicial 
decision making for which he was also famous has not endured.
64
  
                                                                                                                          
most such opinions were on the less controversial cases and “contained very little legal analysis.”  Id. at 
140.  
59 Id. at 142–43 (suggesting that seriatim opinions were used when the Justices were in 
disagreement over a difficult issue or when there was a constitutional issue). 
60 Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court 
Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2086 (1995) (“Marshall signaled [sic] the new 
understanding in his first case as Chief Justice by announcing the decision as ‘the opinion of the 
Court.’” (quoting Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 26 (1801))). 
61 Although many scholars attribute to Chief Justice Marshall the notion that a Court announced 
an opinion of the court or binding precedent as to the reasoning behind a decision, the notion of stare 
decisis as to results is understood as an “accepted principle” of the common law that “was accepted 
before this nation was born.”  C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s 
Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 39 (1990). 
62 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
63  See id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”); BLACK, supra note 20, at 131–32 (“As the majority rules, such a decision is the decision 
of the court, not merely the opinion of the majority judges.”).   
64 See, e.g., Kirman, supra note 60, at 2087 (“The unanimity so prized by Marshall would not, 
however, endure.  Supreme Court decisions containing at least one separate opinion began to grow in 
frequency in the later years of Marshall’s tenure and have escalated in number dramatically in the past 
fifty years.” (footnotes omitted)).  It has been observed that, ironically, Chief Justice Marshall’s effort 
to unify the Court through the majority opinion model likely led to the opposite result over the long-
term.  See Kelsh, supra note 58, at 142 (“Now, what individual Justices thought was of serious 
consequence.  The increased concern with what each Justice said naturally led to an increased concern 
with each Justice’s doctrinal consistency.  Concern over doctrinal consistency became, by the end of 
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Throughout Marshall’s tenure as Chief Justice, his ability to maintain 
unanimity of voice in judicial decisions remained relatively strong, though 
far from absolute.  Although the first separate opinion of a Justice during 
the “opinion of the Court” era was published in the U.S. Reports in 1804, 
just a few years after Marshall became Chief Justice
65
 from 1801 to 1835 
(the duration of the Marshall Court), the “Court issued 1244 opinions and 
only seventy dissents.”66  Dissents remained unpopular, though not 
unheard of, well into the early 1900s.  Illustrative is a letter from Chief 
Justice Taft in 1922 in which he explained, “I don’t approve of dissents 
generally, for I think that in many cases, where I differ from the majority, 
it is more important to stand by the Court and give its judgment weight 
than merely to record my individual dissent.”67  And if dissents were rare, 
pluralities were all but non-existent until the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  Scholars appear to agree that the first plurality decisions arose in 
the mid-1800s, but they were anomalous until considerably later.
68
  
Regardless of their precise date of birth, the increasing frequency of 
plurality decisions has been well documented.  A recent empirical study 
observed:   
                                                                                                                          
the Taney period, an important reason for Justices to write separately.  It is ironic, then, that Marshall 
adopted the innovation of having one Justice speak for the Court as a means of unifying the Court.  
This same innovation also introduced heightened concepts of judicial consistency that later became an 
excuse for many Justices to write separately.” (footnotes omitted)). 
65 ZoBell, supra note 56, at 194 (citing Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
127, 169 (1804)); see also Huidekoper’s Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805) (Johnson, 
J., concurring) (announcing the first dissent from an opinion of the Court); Adam S. Hochschild, Note, 
The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 268 (2000) (“[L]ater in his tenure as Chief Justice, Supreme Court 
decisions were published regularly with multiple opinions.”); Kirman, supra note 60, at 2087 
(“Supreme Court decisions containing at least one separate opinion began to grow in frequency in the 
later years of Marshall’s tenure.”).  But, as ZoBell notes, during Justice Marshall’s first four years, 
“twenty-six decisions were handed down by the Court.  The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the 
Court in all of these save two.”  ZoBell, supra note 56, at 194. 
66 Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court Dissent, 
83 GEO. L.J. 2069, 2074 (1995).  That amounts to a dissent in roughly five percent of all judicial 
decisions of the Court.  Today, plurality decisions occur in between three to four percent of all 
decisions of the Court.  Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 522. 
67 Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, 
and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1311 (2001) (quoting Letter from 
President William Howard Taft to John Hessin Clarke (Feb. 10, 1922)).  By contrast, by 1958 it was 
observed that “[u]nhappily, this unanimity has become . . . a rather atypical example of the manner in 
which members of the present Court have chosen to discharge their judicial duties.”  ZoBell, supra note 
56, at 186; see also id. at 210 (finding that the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics from 1924 states that 
“[i]t is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should use effort and self-
restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion”). 
68 Kelsh, supra note 58, at 154 n.99 (noting that the opinions in Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. 
Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 427 (1853), and Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 561 (1840), 
“could be the first plurality opinions in the Court’s history”).  
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Historically, plurality decisions by the Supreme Court have 
been relatively rare: during the 145 Terms between 1801 and 
1955, the Supreme Court issued only 45 plurality decisions.  
However, during the 54 Terms from 1953 to 2006, the 
Supreme Court issued 195 plurality opinions.
69
 
In short, it was the Marshall-inspired notion of a majority opinion that 
created the chain of events resulting in the plurality precedent problem.  It 
is a product of the collision between increasing dissensus among the 
Justices paired with a steadfast commitment to the precedent model of 
judicial review.  Today, pluralities are relatively common as to important 
and divisive questions, just as seriatim opinions were common to 
controversial cases in the pre-Marshall era.
70
  In the field of constitutional 
criminal law and the death penalty, pluralities are not at all uncommon.  
For example, it was a plurality that suspended the death penalty in Furman, 
and a plurality that reinstated it in Gregg, and a plurality in Baze v. Rees
71
 
that recently ended a de facto death penalty moratorium and upheld a 
state’s lethal injection procedures.  Similar patterns can be found in cases 
involving similarly divisive issues, like abortion, or Guantanamo 
detentions.  So long as a system of precedent dominates our legal analysis, 
the problem of interpreting and applying pluralities is also here to stay.  As 
discussed in the next section, the problem of the fractured plurality 
decision has not proven amenable to an easy or obvious interpretive 
solution. 
B.   A Taxonomy of Plurality Decisions:  Understanding the Disparate 
Types of Pluralities  
Although not a recent judicial phenomena, over the course of 
American history, there has been no more consistency as to how a plurality 
opinion should be interpreted than there is consensus as to a set rationale 
within any single plurality decision.  One of the earliest treatises on 
judicial precedent in the United States, which was compiled in 1912 by 
Henry Campbell Black, the author of the Black’s Law Dictionary, provided 
that:   
If all or a majority of the judges concur in the result . . . but 
differ as to the reasons which lead them to this conclusion, 
the case is not an authority except upon the general result.  
                                                                                                                          
69 Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519 (noting that “the occurrence of plurality opinions 
between 1953 and 2006 has remained fairly steady” with a mean and a median of about three pluralities 
per Term). 
70 Corley et al., supra note 12, at 181 (observing that pluralities arise in about four decisions per 
term, or three and one-third percent of the Court’s cases). 
71 553 U.S. 35 (2008).   
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For if one judge announces certain rules, principles, or 
doctrines of law as the reasons which incline him to the 
decision to be made, and another is induced to the same end 
by a different view of the rules, principles or doctrines, it 
cannot be said that any one of the rules considered or any one 
of the steps in the reasoning has received the assent of the 
court.
72
 
The approach summarized by Black seems to have enjoyed support 
throughout the periods in the Court’s history when plurality decisions were 
extremely rare, and it represents a rather intuitive approach to plurality 
precedent.  After all, “it is neither obvious as a matter of history, nor 
intuitive as a matter of constitutional interpretation, that pluralities do 
anything more than announce a judgment in the particular case.”73  
Nonetheless, as pluralities became more common and the corresponding 
institutional embarrassment resulting from a gap in the precedent more 
pronounced, there arose an irresistible judicial temptation to attempt to 
divine binding precedent as to the rationale and not merely the result of a 
non-majority decision.  Commentators have explained that initially the 
lower courts tended to regard the opinion receiving the most votes, the 
plurality opinion, as precedential.
74
  That is to say, lower courts had 
coalesced around the idea that pluralities create binding precedent.  In 
1977, the Court reviewed its fractured obscenity case law, and in Marks, 
ratified the will of the lower courts in treating plurality decisions as the 
source of binding precedent.
75
  Notably, however, Marks altered the 
inquiry such that the plurality opinion was no longer precedential, and 
instead implemented the narrowest grounds formulation for discerning 
precedent.
76
   
The recent proliferation of plurality decisions has made familiarity 
with the narrowest grounds test a critical aspect of the study of 
constitutional law.  Accordingly, there is a chorus of law professors who 
have called for the Marks rule to be given greater attention in law school.   
For example, leading scholars like Maxwell Stearns are shocked by the fact 
that young lawyers and judges “systematically err” in discerning the 
holding of a plurality, and thus advocate for including the Marks doctrine 
in the core of the modern legal curriculum.
77
  I share the desire to increase 
                                                                                                                          
72 BLACK, supra note 20, at 135–36 (footnotes omitted). 
73 Marceau, supra note 55, at 167. 
74 Novak, supra note 16, at 774. 
75 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
76 Notably, there do not appear to be any lower court cases that relied on the “narrowest grounds” 
formulation until after Marks was decided.  In Marks, however, the Court notes that nearly every circuit 
court had concluded that the plurality decision in question created binding precedent.  Id. at 194. 
77 Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of 
Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 322 (2000). 
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the attention directed at the Marks rule, but not for the sake of increasing 
the doctrine’s claim of objective applicability.  Rather, my expectation is 
that more and deeper conversations about Marks among lawyers and 
students will lift the veil of Marks—that is, judges and lawyers will see  
Marks for what it is, a precedent that is not truly precedential in any 
conventional sense.
78
  As a decisional rule, or limitation on judicial 
decision making, the doctrine imposes few limitations, and whatever the 
virtues of such an approach from an acoustic separation standpoint, it is not 
the case that the rule provides a comprehensible path to discerning 
plurality precedent.      
Notably, however, not all forms of plurality decisions are equally 
deserving of rebuke, and thus before proceeding, it is helpful to create a 
taxonomy of the types of plurality decisions.  It is useful to divide 
pluralities into four categories: (1) the false plurality; (2) the false majority 
opinion; (3) the predictive plurality; and (4) the common denominator 
plurality.  The remainder of this section will briefly define these four 
categories and consider how, in the abstract, they produce varying degrees 
of confusion under the Marks rule framework.
79
  It is those pluralities that 
are least deserving of precedential force that benefit most from the Marks 
rule’s acoustic separation.      
1.  False Plurality 
The first type of plurality decision has been labeled by previous 
commentators as a false plurality, insofar as it is more like a majority 
opinion than a plurality.
80
  A false plurality is said to exist when less than 
                                                                                                                          
78 A body of empirical work is beginning to develop that attempts to explain why pluralities occur 
and to predict the sort of circumstances that make pluralities more likely.  See, e.g., Spriggs & Stras, 
supra note 17, at 532 (considering various factors such as collegiality, ideology, whether the case came 
up after the Marks decision, whether the case reflects a lower court split, and measuring the impact of 
each on the likelihood of a plurality decision).  Impressive as these studies are from a quantitative 
perspective, they do little to advance our understanding of the qualitative value of plurality decisions in 
our system of precedent.  Understanding the scope and nature of plurality precedent will reduce judicial 
“transaction costs” and will better facilitate a consistent system of precedent.  Id. at 529 (quoting 
Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the 
Prediction Model of Precedent, 58 EMORY L.J. 207, 233 (2008)).  Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall 
ushered in the era of the majority opinion, and with it the efficiencies and power of precedent.  See 
supra Part III.A.  Chief Justice Marshall also enshrined the concept of judicial review under which it is 
the Court that “expound[s]” and announces the content of our Constitution.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Even accepting both of these modifications to our tripartite model of 
governance, it is difficult to regard as constitutional a system that accepts judicial pronouncements on 
the Constitution with less than a majority of the Court. 
79 Previous commentators have developed a slightly different taxonomy.  See, e.g., Power, supra 
note 54, at 133 (identifying three categories from the previous literature—false, illegitimate, and true—
and identifying a fourth category called constructive pluralities). 
80 Hochschild, supra note 3, at 272; see also Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130–32 (1981) [hereinafter Plurality Decisions] (“In some 
cases that are nominally plurality decisions, however, a majority of the Court does support a rationale 
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five Justices join any single opinion, but when a majority of Justices 
writing separately concur in an underlying rationale.
81
  In other words, a 
false plurality decision must contain within itself an actual majority 
agreement as to one or more holdings.  The defining feature of a false 
plurality is the existence of an actual, and not merely tacit, majority 
holding.  In these circumstances, the point of majority agreement—the 
shared holding—although it is disguised by being spread across more than 
one opinion, is entitled to precedential force.
82
   
An example of a false plurality is United States v. Patane.
83
  In 
Patane, a defendant who had just been arrested interrupted the police 
during their Miranda warnings so that the full warnings were not provided, 
but the officers proceeded to interrogate the defendant about whether he 
had an illegal gun.
84
  The defendant made admissions that led to the 
discovery of an unlawful gun, and later moved to suppress the weapon.
85
  
A three-Justice plurality opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Scalia, and 
Rehnquist concluded that the officers’ conduct did not violate Miranda and 
that, in any event, a violation of Miranda would not justify the suppression 
of physical fruits like the gun at issue in this case.
86
  A two-Justice 
concurring opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, agreed that 
there was generally no suppression remedy available in cases of alleged 
Miranda violations that lead to the discovery of physical evidence, but the 
concurring Justices refused to reach the question of whether there was in 
fact a Miranda violation on the facts of the case.
87
  In other words, there 
                                                                                                                          
sufficient to justify the holding.”); Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in 
Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 99 n.4 (1956) (omitting from “the no-clear-majority” discussion 
cases where “though less than a majority of the Court specifically joined in one opinion, the separate 
opinions contain substantial agreement as to rationale”). 
81 Hochschild, supra note 3, at 272. 
82 Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 451–52 (1992).  Some treatises have referred to 
decisions as pluralities even when the fifth Justice concurs in the opinion and result if that Justice also 
writes separately to explain the rule in his own terms.  See, e.g., Jared H. Jones, Annotation, Women’s 
Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion and Governmental Regulation Thereof—Supreme Court 
Cases, 20 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 21 n.5 (2007) (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), as a plurality but noting that Justice Stevens’s separate 
opinion in Thornburgh concurs in both the rationale and judgment of Justice Blackmun’s majority 
opinion).  Rather than referring to them as pluralities, when a Justice actually joins the reasoning of a 
majority opinion, the concurrence is best regarded as a “two-cents” concurrence.  Lewis A. Kornhauser 
& Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
8 n.14 (1993) (explaining that “in ‘two-cents’ concurrences, the author is willing to join in both the 
outcome and rationale sponsored by the majority, but wishes to add her own, presumably consistent, 
thoughts on the matter”).    
83 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
84 Id. at 635. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 630, 643–44. 
87 Id. at 645. 
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was a common nucleus of agreement—suppression of physical evidence is 
generally not available when law enforcement fails to comply with 
Miranda—but the Court failed to provide a majority opinion.88   
In circumstances such as this, the points of majority agreement should 
be recognized as binding precedent, and the remainder of the decisions 
treated as, at best, distracting dictum.  Because there is a majority rationale 
as to one or more dispositive issues in these cases, that holding should be 
recognized as binding.  Had the opinions been structured differently, a 
majority opinion, albeit perhaps a relatively small one, could have been 
written, and while it is more cumbersome to discern the precedent, lower 
courts are duty-bound to do so.  There is no need for acoustic separation 
because lower courts have a duty to apply, not the Marks rule, but ordinary 
principles of stare decisis insofar as there is explicit agreement of 
reasoning by a majority of the court.
89
        
2.  False Majority Decisions 
A second category of cases presents exactly the opposite problem.  
Whereas a false plurality is a decision that has a majority rationale 
although it is not structured or identified as such by the Court, a false 
majority arises when the Court purports to provide an “opinion of the 
Court,”90 but one or more concurrences demonstrate that, in actuality, there 
is only majority agreement as to the result and not the rationale.
91
  These 
decisions could aptly be described as “constructive pluralit[ies],”92 insofar 
as a careful study of the opinions allows one to infer the absence of a 
majority agreement as to one or more of the rationales underlying the 
majority opinion.  The false majority is most likely to arise when the Court 
is fractured, for example 5-4, and one of the Justices who joined the 
opinion of the Court writes a separate concurrence that seems to present a 
                                                                                                                          
88 One commentator has described what he calls the “illegitimate pluralities” as a separate 
category of plurality.  Plurality Decisions, supra note 80, at 1133.  The key feature of this plurality is 
that one or more Justices concur in the judgment on the basis of some rule of law that is contrary to 
existing precedent.  See id. (noting that “illegitimate pluralit[y] occur[s] when Justices choose to ignore 
prior cases in structuring their opinions, in spite of the fact that those cases retain majority support on 
the Court”).  While noteworthy from the perspective of studying a particular Justice, or judicial 
collegiality, such decisions do not present any fundamentally distinct interpretive issues.   
89 Applying the Marks rule to a false plurality allows a judge to identify the “outer limit[s] of the 
majority agreement.”  Thurmon, supra note 82, at 453. 
90 Hochschild, supra note 3, at 261. 
91 Plurality Decisions, supra note 80, at 1130 n.21 (“Conversely, a case decided by a majority of 
which one or more members write a limiting concurrence might be best understood as a plurality 
decision.”).  
92 At least one commentator has used the term constructive plurality before, and though he does 
not fully expound on its meaning, he seems to envision a scenario analogous to the false majority 
opinion I am describing here.  Power, supra note 54, at 133–34 n.193 (“A constructive plurality . . . has 
what purports to be a majority opinion that upon examination turns out to represent different views 
sheltered under one rubric.”).   
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fundamentally different approach to the legal question presented by the 
case.
93
  In such circumstances, the concurring opinion might be regarded as 
the critical fifth vote, and predictive of the outcomes in future cases, and as 
such, the opinion may have a viable claim to the status of a holding of the 
Court.
94
   
One example of a false majority or constructive plurality is the 
Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. Gant.95  At issue in Gant was the 
scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement.
96
  Justice Stevens delivered an opinion for the Court, over the 
dissent of four Justices, holding that police may search a vehicle incident 
to arrest “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance” of the car at the 
time of the search or if “it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”97  Despite joining the opinion of the 
Court, and thus making the Stevens opinion a majority opinion, Justice 
Scalia wrote separately to explain that he would, given the opportunity, 
prefer to abandon the general rules regarding search incident to arrest in 
the vehicle context and “hold that a vehicle search incident to arrest is . . . 
‘reasonable’ only when the object of the search is evidence of the crime for 
which the arrest was made.”98  In other words, although purporting to 
concur in the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia rejects a full half of the 
majority’s reasoning and concludes that searches incident to arrest of 
automobiles should never be automatically permitted, and instead would 
permit them only when it is reasonable to believe that there is evidence 
relating to the offense of arrest in the car.
99
  In effect, then, Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence converts the bare five Justice majority into a 4-1-4 plurality.
100
  
Only those aspects of the majority opinion that Justice Scalia agrees with 
enjoy the assent and support of a majority of the Justices supporting 
                                                                                                                          
93 Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Note, Powelling for Precedent: “Binding” Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 695 (2009) (describing these as “fifth vote concurrences” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also id. (“When judges on lower courts encounter this kind of opinion, they have 
sometimes considered the opinion of the concurring Justice as the precedent of the Court, reasoning 
that he provided the crucial swing vote.”). 
94 Id. at 698 (explaining that “[g]enerally, lower courts will not express their approach as ‘Justice 
X acted as the fifth vote, and therefore we are adopting his reasoning’” but acknowledging that this sort 
of reasoning does occur in published decisions). 
95  556 U.S. 332 (2009).  As the discussion that follows makes clear, the Gant decision is best 
understood as including one holding that is a true majority rationale and a second rationale that is a 
false majority.   
96 Id. at 338.  
97 Id. at 351.   
98 Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
99 Id. 
100 Justice Alito notes this in his dissenting opinion.  Id. at 355 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
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judgment.  One might, then, argue that Justice Scalia’s opinion announces 
the constitutional rule rather than the majority opinion.
101
   
The false majority, then, presents an interpretive conundrum not 
unlike a true plurality.  How should lower courts proceed in assessing the 
binding precedent of Gant when the facts are such that the search would 
only be constitutional under one of the two approaches outlined in the 
majority opinion?  One view is that Justice Scalia’s concurrence was a 
brilliant judicial maneuver insofar as he avoided the confusion surrounding 
plurality precedent by joining the majority opinion, but by writing 
separately, he simultaneously limited the majority opinion.  Under this 
view, after Gant, a search incident to arrest is only lawful when the officer 
reasonably believed that evidence of the offense of arrest will be found in 
the car.
102
  To be sure, this is a controversial narrowing of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine and one might resist this reading of Gant by 
noting that there is actually majority support for the broader, older search 
incident to arrest doctrine relating to a search of the car contemporaneous 
with the arrest that Justice Scalia rejects.
103
  Indeed, in support of the vision 
of the search incident to arrest rule rejected by Justice Scalia, one could 
argue that there are actually eight votes in support of the approach to the 
search incident to arrest doctrine that was rejected by Scalia.  Specifically, 
the four dissenters plus the four (non-Scalia) majority Justices all favor 
some form of Belton type search, thus establishing an 8-1 split in favor of 
retaining this form of search.
104
  Perhaps implicitly, this is the reasoning of 
the lower courts that have, apparently without exception, accepted the 
continued vitality of a Belton-type search.  However, it is far from obvious 
that this approach is the appropriate means of discerning the holding in a 
case like Gant.
105
  At the very least, it is worth acknowledging the 
                                                                                                                          
101 By way of analogy, in South Dakota v. Opperman, the Court addressed the constitutionality of 
warrantless, suspicionless inventory searches, and in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Burger, the 
Court upheld the procedures.  428 U.S. 364, 364–67 (1976).  Notably, however, Justice Powell, who 
joined the majority opinion, wrote separately and expressed a narrower, more fact specific approach to 
the constitutional question at issue.  See Pelham-Webb, supra note 93, at 707 (describing the 
Opperman case, and explaining that a lower court chose to adopt Justice Powell’s Opperman 
concurrence because of Justice Powell’s “view of the limited nature of the permissible inventory 
searches”).  Because Justice Powell’s concurrence differed so dramatically from the rule announced in 
the majority opinion he joined, and because Powell was the critical fifth vote, some lower courts have 
treated the Powell concurrence as the controlling opinion.  Id. 
102 Justice Scalia notes that he would “hold in the present case” that the Court should “simply 
abandon the Belton-Thornton charade,” but he candidly acknowledges that “[n]o other Justice” shares 
his views on this point.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 353–54 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
103 Id. at 335. 
104 Cf. id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view we should simply abandon the Belton-
Thornton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases.”). 
105 There are at least two substantial problems with such an interpretation.  First, the process of 
discerning a holding has traditionally been limited to an examination of what rationales are necessary to 
the result. Cf. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959 
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uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of such opinions.  Even where 
the Court announces a majority opinion, it may be inconsistent with the 
origins and purpose of precedential reasoning to afford stare decisis effect 
to such an opinion when the reasoning of the opinion obviously lacks true 
majority support.
106
   
3.  Predictive Plurality 
A third category of non-majority decision is the predictive plurality.  
As elaborated immediately below, the predictive plurality has the weakest 
claim to be regarded as having generated any precedent at all, but it is 
precisely this characteristic that provides the Marks rule’s form of acoustic 
separation its most beneficent application in this context.  Even more than 
a false majority opinion, or a common denominator plurality, a predictive 
plurality has a tenuous claim to precedential value and, thus, the need for 
acoustic separation via the Marks platform is at its apex in this context.  
The defining feature of a predictive plurality is a majority judgment 
with separate opinions supporting the judgment that lack both actual and 
constructive agreement as to a rationale.  A false plurality is not a 
predictive plurality because although there is not an opinion of the court, 
there is constructive agreement among five or more Justices as to a single 
determinative rationale.  A false majority decision, by contrast, could be a 
predictive plurality if the various opinions supporting the judgment so 
undermine the majority opinion as to render illusory the promise of a 
majority holding.     
By way of illustration, consider again the opinions of Gant.  
Specifically, consider the result if Justice Scalia had not joined the majority 
opinion authored by Justice Stevens because it was written more narrowly 
so as to exclude his preferred holding as to why the search in question was 
                                                                                                                          
(2005) (“[T]he definition of obiter dictum in Black’s Law Dictionary: ‘[a] judicial comment made 
while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore 
not precedential.’” (footnote omitted)).  Accordingly, reliance on the reasoning of a dissent is an 
illogical basis for establishing the content of a majority holding.  Second, there is actually no true 
overlap between the reasoning of the majority and the dissenting Justices as to the scope of an 
appropriate search incident to arrest insofar as these competing groups disagree as to what type of 
Belton searches are constitutional.  Indeed, as to the holding that a search is permissible so long as the 
officer is within the actual reaching distance of the vehicle, Justice Alito clarified that his dissent did 
not overlap with this approach by noting that this rule is “truly endorsed by only four Justices.” Gant, 
556 U.S. at 355 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
106 Another example of a false majority is the Supreme Court’s decision addressing whether 
innocence can serve as a justification for overlooking a habeas petitioner’s procedural default.  Schlup 
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 300–01 (1995).  A leading habeas treatise concludes that Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Schlup actually defines the holding, in spite of the fact that Justice O’Connor joined the 
majority opinion.  BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS LITIGATION § 9B:82 (2012) (citing the Marks rule in order to support the claim that Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence was precedential).    
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unconstitutional.
107
  This would have created three distinct opinions, a  
4-1-4, each resting on a distinct rationale.  First, the plurality decision for 
four Justices would have affirmed the judgment of the Arizona Supreme 
Court by concluding that an automobile search is permissible if, and only 
if, the arrestee is unsecured and within close proximity to the car.  Second, 
Justice Scalia would have concurred in the judgment without joining the 
majority opinion and his opinion, while also concluding that the search in 
question was unreasonable, would have done so exclusively because there 
was no evidence of the offense of arrest to be found in the car.  Finally, the 
four dissenters would have expressed the view that the search of an 
automobile is always permissible so long as it is done within a relatively 
short amount of time after the arrest of the person, regardless of whether 
the arrestee is unsecured or not.    
Such a plurality is purely predictive.  In any given future litigation 
about the search incident to arrest, a lower court judge could reasonably 
predict the outcome of the case if the case were considered by the Supreme 
Court based on the Court’s prior plurality.  And, the lower courts could 
make this prediction despite the absence of actual overlapping assent as to 
a single constitutional rationale.  For example, if a search of an automobile 
occurred when a single police officer had arrested four individuals and was 
unable to secure them all, then it is certain that at least the Justices from the 
plurality opinion and the four Justices in dissent would sanction this 
search—that is, the vote would be 8-1 in support of a judgment treating 
such a search as constitutional.  Notably, however, if the four Justices in 
favor of narrowing the search incident to arrest exception attempted to 
craft a narrow search incident to arrest doctrine that focused on the number 
and unsecured nature of the arrestees in this scenario, then the four 
dissenters would join only the result—permitting the search—and would 
not assent to the rationale.  As a result, although a lower court could 
predict the result, there would be another plurality decision, this time a  
4-4-1, with only Justice Scalia dissenting.
108
  Similarly, in circumstances 
where the search would be permitted under Justice Scalia’s formulation 
because there was a likelihood that evidence of the offense of arrest might 
be found in the automobile, if the events surrounding the arrest were such 
that the arrestee was secured in the back of the patrol car at the time of the 
search, then, it is likely that the decision in Gant would be inverted.  That 
is to say, it would be a 4-1-4 decision, but the four Justices writing the 
                                                                                                                          
107 Recall that the majority opinion in Gant actually reasoned that under either of two alternative 
theories for limiting the search incident to arrest doctrine, the search in question was unconstitutional.  
556 U.S. at 351.   
108 Such a prediction, of course, assumes a consistent composition on the Court.  But similar vote 
prediction is possible if one assumes that Justice Sotomayor would join the reasoning of Justice 
Stevens whom she replaced. 
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plurality decision would now be the four Justices from the dissent in Gant 
who would authorize all automobile searches that are roughly 
contemporaneous with an arrest, and Justice Scalia would once again 
concur, resting his opinion on independent legal grounds relating to the 
likelihood of finding evidence in the car.    
Many other rather surprising permutations are conceivable with just 
this one rather simple example of a plurality.  The point of this 
hypothetical Gant plurality is to illustrate how strange it would be for 
lower courts to identify any reasoning in such a plurality as binding.  In 
circumstances such as this, there simply is not an opinion of the Court.  
The necessary question, then, is whether a plurality that predicts a result, 
but lacks any true consensus of reasoning, produces binding precedent.  It 
seems a stretch, even for the staunchest supporters of Marbury, to reason 
that because it is the duty of the Court to expound the meaning of the 
Constitution, the Court does so even if the Court itself is unable to reach 
bare majority agreement as to what the Constitution means in a given 
context.  Nonetheless, numerous lower courts have blurred the line 
between binding constitutional holdings and merely predictive vote 
counting.
109
   
Most revealing in this regard has been the lower courts’ treatment of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Baze,110 an approach to stare decisis that I 
have previously described as “precedent by personnel.”111  In Baze, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection 
procedures under the Eight Amendment.
112
  Unfortunately, no opinion 
gained more than three votes, and lower courts were left “to quarrel over 
the weight and precedential value to be accorded to the case’s seven 
separate opinions.”113  In support of the judgment upholding Kentucky’s 
lethal injection procedures, Justice Roberts—writing for Justices Alito and 
Kennedy—concluded that in order to violate the Eighth Amendment, a 
procedure must present an “objectively intolerable risk of harm” in the face 
of a readily available alternative procedure.
114
  By contrast, Justices 
Thomas and Scalia concurred in judgment, but emphasized that the 
plurality’s rationale is entirely unacceptable insofar as it is inconsistent 
with “the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause” and explained, instead, that the Eighth Amendment is only 
                                                                                                                          
109 Courts applying this sort of approach tend to cite without explanation the Marks formula and 
then reason in a manner similar to the following: “[A]ny conclusion that Justice Kennedy reaches in 
favor of federal authority . . . will command the support of five Justices.”  United States v. Gerke 
Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). 
110 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
111 Marceau, supra note 55, at 203.    
112 Baze, 553 U.S. at 40–41. 
113 Marceau, supra note 55, at 160. 
114 Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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violated if the method of execution is “deliberately designed to inflict” 
serious pain and suffering.
115
  In addition, Justice Stevens concurred, but 
limited his decision in support of judgment to the rationale that on these 
facts, there was no Eighth Amendment violation and refused to adopt a 
single rule of general application.
116
  Interestingly, even though there is no 
shared reasoning between the Thomas concurrence and the Roberts 
plurality, Justice Thomas emphasizes that he “cannot subscribe to the 
plurality opinion’s formulation of the governing standard”117—every 
circuit court to have addressed the issue has effectively regarded Baze as a 
clear 6-3 decision and treated the Roberts plurality as a binding rationale 
insofar as its application can fairly predict outcomes among the sitting 
judges.
118
  There is a sense that the Marks rule’s narrowest grounds 
formulation is functionally equivalent to an opinion that predicts results in 
future cases.  Lower courts adopting this approach to plurality precedent 
attach the legal force of an opinion of the Court to a decision that lacks a 
shared holding, much less an opinion of the Court.   
Illustrative of the lower court trend in favor of conflating narrowest 
grounds with predictive ability is the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on Baze in 
2011
119
: 
If an execution protocol is found constitutional under the 
plurality’s substantial risk standard, Justices Thomas and 
Scalia will concur in the judgment, because their standard for 
constitutionality is broader—a protocol that does not present 
a substantial risk of serious pain likely is not deliberately 
designed to inflict such pain.  If the protocol is found 
unconstitutional under the plurality’s standard, then Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and likely Stevens would concur in 
the judgment because their standards for constitutionality are 
narrower—a protocol that presents a substantial risk of 
serious pain likely also presents an unnecessary risk of 
serious pain.  The plurality’s standard, therefore, is the 
narrowest necessary to secure a majority in any given 
challenge to a method of execution.
120
 
                                                                                                                          
115 Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
116 Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
118 See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2011); Raby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552 
(5th Cir. 2010); Cooey v. Strickland, 589 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 2009) (demonstrating that the circuit courts 
are using Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion as binding precedent). 
119 Mark Alan Thurmon previously noted the inability of courts to distinguish between precedent 
as to a result and precedent as to a rationale.  See Thurmon, supra note 82, at 439–40 (illustrating this 
principal using the Marks holdings and how the lower courts applied them to other cases). 
120 Dickens v. Brewer, 631 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011).  One has to wonder if the plurality 
has a truly predictive quality.  It is conceivable, if improbable, that a state’s execution procedure is 
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Many other plurality decisions provide merely predictive guidance as 
to future voting patterns, and the question for lower courts is whether such 
decisions contain a narrowest ground.
121
  That is to say, at least on the 
surface, it appears that lower courts and lawyers are saddled with the 
unenviable task of applying the Marks rule to decisions for which there is 
not a truly narrowest ground.  However, once one accepts the existence of 
acoustic separation in this sphere, the existence of which is established in 
the remaining sections of this Article, the onerous, impossible task of 
manufacturing predictive precedent becomes largely unnecessary.  Indeed, 
predictive pluralities, precisely because they have the most tenuous claim 
to precedential force, are most benefitted by the acoustic separation theory 
which facilitates the public pretense of precedent while subtly facilitating 
lower court experimentation.    
4.  Common Denominator Pluralities 
The fourth type of plurality is a common denominator plurality.
122
  A 
common denominator plurality is one for which there is a tacit majority 
holding—that is to say, the hallmark of a common denominator plurality is 
the existence of an “implicit” or constructive majority holding.  The 
majority is implicit or requires an inferential step because there is not an 
opinion of the Court, but the key is to recognize that there must be some 
commonality of reasoning.  In this way, all false pluralities are common 
denominator pluralities insofar as there is actual majority agreement as to 
at least one dispositive question of law.  Stated another way, a court 
searching for a common denominator precedent is, as a practical matter, 
identifying the “outer limit of the majority agreement.”123   
                                                                                                                          
deliberately designed to cause pain, thus violating the limitations announced in Justice Thomas’s 
opinion, without being objectively likely to cause substantial harm. 
121 For example, a recent Clean Water Act case, Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), 
has produced several lower court opinions that define the Court’s precedent in purely predictive terms.  
For example, the First Circuit has embraced a reading of the Rapanos plurality that turns on predicting 
likely vote outcomes in future cases by counting votes across the various opinions, including the 
dissent.  United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that this approach allows 
“lower courts [to] find jurisdiction in all cases where a majority of the Court would support such a 
finding”).  Other courts have recognized that such vote counting is inconsistent with the plain language 
of the Marks formula, and therefore refused to apply it.  See, e.g., United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 
1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Marks talks about those who ‘concurred in the judgment[],’ not those 
who did not join the judgment.  It would be inconsistent with Marks to allow the dissenting Rapanos 
Justices to carry the day and impose an ‘either/or’ test, whereby CWA jurisdiction would exist when 
either Justice Scalia’s test or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied.” (citation omitted)). 
122 The Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of the Marks rule seems to favor true agreement 
among the Justices, and thus reflects the common denominator approach: “The doctrine that, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court issues a fractured, plurality opinion, the opinion of the justices concurring in the 
judgment on the narrowest grounds—that is, the legal standard with which a majority of the Court 
would agree—is considered the Court’s holding.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (9th ed. 2009).   
123 Thurmon, supra note 82, at 453. 
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For some courts and commentators, only common denominator 
pluralities should be afforded precedential status, and only to the extent of 
the majority agreement.  The rationale for requiring a common 
denominator of reasoning is that a decision announcing the meaning of the 
Constitution without any semblance of majority assent is inconsistent with 
the rule of law.
124
  As the D.C. Circuit has defined this application of the 
Marks rule: “the narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator 
of the Court’s reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by 
at least five Justices who support the judgment.”125  But the process of 
inferring majority agreement often seems just as elusive and intractable as 
the Marks formulation itself—how should a judge set out to discern a 
common denominator of reasoning among various opinions that are 
fundamentally inconsistent.
126
  Unfortunately, the aesthetic purity of the 
common denominator approach is tarnished by its uncertain application.  
In many instances, applying a common denominator plurality precedent 
may not, in a meaningful sense, represent a holding of the Court any more 
than a predictive plurality.  That is to say, there is always the risk that this 
sort of artificial, or manufactured, consensus will not, in practical terms, 
represent a majority holding any more than a purely predictive plurality, 
and unfortunately, the guidance for distinguishing common denominator 
pluralities has proven no less confusing than the Marks rule itself.  Most 
notably, the plurality decisions that the Supreme Court and lower courts 
have identified as obvious, or easy examples of a common denominator 
rationale, are themselves substantially unhelpful.   
To date, lower courts and the Supreme Court have regarded plurality 
decisions for which there is an absolutist concurrence as the most 
amenable to a straightforward common denominator approach.
127
  The idea 
                                                                                                                          
124 See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 715 (1995) 
(warning of potential rule of law concerns, such as an overemphasis on the role of individual judges, 
that arise when predictive methods are employed).  Notably, the common denominator form of 
plurality is not necessarily incompatible with a predictive plurality.  For example, some courts have 
suggested that a predictive plurality is only precedential insofar as there is a common denominator 
among the various concurring opinions.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 
2010) (recognizing that, in the absence of a true commonality of reasoning, there is no binding holding 
from the Supreme Court).  Probably all common denominator pluralities will serve a predictive 
function, as does a majority opinion, but the key point is that not all predictive pluralities will have a 
common denominator of reasoning.   
125 King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
126 See Thurmon, supra note 82, at 432–33 (describing how a recent case highlighted “the fallacy 
of applying the ‘implicit consensus’ justification”); see also Tyson Snow, Adding Marks to the Mix of 
an Already Muddled Decision Regarding Public Forums and Freedom of Speech on the Internet, 19 
BYU J. PUB. L. 299, 304 (2004) (“Most of the confusion surrounding the Marks analysis arises from a 
single question: whether the concurring opinions must share some fundamental basis or similar 
reasoning before being proffered as the Court’s true holding.”). 
127 See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209–10 (6th Cir. 2009) (“For cases like 
Furman and Memoirs, Marks’ application is straightforward.”); see also United States v. Johnson, 467 
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is that the Justices with the more extreme or absolutist positions will 
necessarily agree with the less extreme opinions in support of the same 
judgment, and thus the less extreme opinion is said to be a common 
denominator of the two opinions.  For example, in discerning the narrowest 
ground in Furman, where five separate Justices held the death penalty 
schemes at issue to be unconstitutional, it is routine for courts to point out 
that both Justices Marshall and Brennan regarded the death penalty as 
“unconstitutional in all circumstances” and thus, so the reasoning goes, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall would necessarily agree with Justices 
Stewart, Douglas, and White that it was unconstitutional when 
administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
128
  Likewise, the First 
Circuit has recently considered plurality decisions in the First Amendment 
context, and reasoned:  
[I]n Memoirs, the absolutist view of the First Amendment 
held by two Justices would always require a ruling in favor 
of protecting speech, but the view of three other Justices that 
only non-obscene speech is protected would extend First 
Amendment protection only to a subset of such cases.  Thus, 
the less sweeping opinion in each case represents the 
“narrowest grounds” for the decision.129 
To be sure, there is a sort of intuitiveness to this understanding of the 
common denominator rule.  Insofar as the opinions of some of the Justices 
concurring in judgment in Furman and A Book Named “John Cleland’s 
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
130
 are not absolute or per se, and thus 
reflect a notion of narrowness that resembles nesting Russian dolls,
131
 
where the more absolute opinion simply encompasses the less absolute,
132
 
                                                                                                                          
F.3d 56, 62–66 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The Marks directive that [w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); King, 950 F.2d at 781–84 
(“[T]he narrowest opinion must represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.”). 
128 King, 950 F.2d at 781. 
129 Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64. 
130 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
131 These dolls are called “matryoshka”: “Any of a set of traditional Russian wooden dolls of 
differing sizes, each somewhat resembling a skittle in shape and designed to nest inside the next 
largest.”  Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford English Dictionary: The Definitive Record of the English 
Language, available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/239595?redirectedFrom=matryoshka#eid (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
132 A lower court attempting to explain the result in Marks observed that “the plurality’s opinion 
[in Memoirs] was the ‘narrowest’ in the sense that it was the most conservative reason for reversing the 
finding of obscenity and it was a reason that was subsumed within the grounds articulated by the other 
justices who concurred in the judgment.”  Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847 (E.D. Mich. 
2001), vacated, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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it seems fair to regard the less expansive opinion as the common 
denominator.  Upon further reflection, however, it is far from obvious that 
absolutist opinions are truly capable of exhibiting shared reasoning or 
logical overlap so as to generate any meaningful implicit majority 
consensus.  Constitutional interpretation is not so binary as to render 
meaningful the view that a less absolute position is intellectually consistent 
with the absolutist view, but narrower.  For example, while it is true that 
Justices Brennan and Marshall would have agreed with their fellow 
concurring Justices that an arbitrary capital sentencing system is 
unconstitutional, this agreement of result does not suggest a true overlap of 
reasoning.  Stated more directly, it is difficult to believe that there is 
actually a shared trajectory of reasoning or a logical consensus between 
Justice Brennan’s absolute rejection of the death penalty in all cases, and 
the purely procedural objections to certain capital sentencing systems 
voiced by his concurring colleagues.
133
  These Justices may have agreed on 
certain results, as they did in Furman, but inferring a truly shared holding, 
rather than a predictive holding seems a fool’s errand.  Likewise, a 
conclusion that Justices White and Stewart provide the narrowest grounds 
in a case like Furman, as is the convention, is odd for the additional reason 
that the two Justices did not join each other’s concurrences, but rather each 
wrote separately and provided his own explanation for finding the system 
in question unconstitutional.
134
  
In short, the rule of law problems that arise out of reliance on merely 
predictive pluralities as precedential have led courts to look for 
commonality of reasoning when they seek to apply the Marks rule.  To this 
end, lower courts have observed that discerning a common denominator of 
reasoning is, at least in some cases, like Furman, “straightforward.”135   
But the reality is quite different.  Searching for an implicit majority 
rationale, when there is no explicit agreement of approach, is frustratingly 
                                                                                                                          
133 See Thurmon, supra note 82, at 431–32 (making the same point as to the Memoirs plurality 
that “[a]lthough the outcomes of these approaches may sometimes coincide, the attempt to reconcile the 
reasoning underlying these approaches strains the credibility of the ‘implicit consensus’ model” 
(footnote omitted)).   
134 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (“I begin with what I 
consider a near truism: that the death penalty could so seldom be imposed that it would cease to be a 
credible deterrent.”); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and 
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.  For, of all the people 
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners 
are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been 
imposed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
135 United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209 (6th Cir. 2009); see also id. (“Specifically, Marks 
is workable—one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’ than another—only when one 
opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions. . . . In both Memoirs and Furman the controlling 
opinion was less doctrinally sweeping.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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futile in most cases.
136
  Attempts to construct or infer a majority rationale 
are inherently difficult and the resulting “narrowest ground” will not reflect 
any truly shared reasoning except in cases of false pluralities.
137
  
Constructive consensus is, in most cases, the same as non-consensus, 
which is the same as a non-majority opinion being afforded precedential 
force.  Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that in many 
circumstances, a common denominator approach to plurality precedent will 
be no more capable of reliably generating authoritative precedent than the 
predictive plurality approach.   
The remaining sections of this Article demonstrate that this 
disconnect between the absence of actual precedent and the Marks promise 
of precedent is the result of a salutary application of the acoustic separation 
theory in the realm of plurality precedent.  By examining how the Supreme 
Court has responded to its own plurality precedent, and how lower courts 
tend to apply Supreme Court pluralities, it is possible to recognize that a 
surprising degree of acoustic separation has emerged between the 
precedent as promised in Marks, and the rule as actually applied by the 
courts.  
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S APPLICATION OF MARKS:  UPWARD-FLOWING 
PRECEDENT AS THE INTERNAL MESSAGE FOR LOWER COURTS 
As discussed above, Chief Justice Marshall’s pursuit of a Supreme 
Court that was more respected and celebrated contributed to the move 
away from seriatim decisions toward binding opinions of the Court.   One 
of the goals of the precedent model of judicial review, then, is the 
safeguarding of the Court’s reputation and prestige.  Pluralities, as 
decisions lacking an opinion of the Court, represent a recurring affront to 
                                                                                                                          
136 The complicated common denominator analysis becomes even more vexing when there are 
distinct rationales as to both the substantive and the procedural aspects within the various opinions of a 
concurring decision.  The Court might conclude that a particular opinion is the narrowest ground as to a 
procedural issue, but not the narrowest ground as to a substantive question of law.  See, e.g., 
Christopher Seeds, The Afterlife of Ford and Panetti: Execution Competence and the Capacity to Assist 
Counsel, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 309, 335–36 (2009) (identifying such a problem with the interpretation 
of the Court’s plurality decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)). 
137 Extending the reading of Marks such that the existence of absolutist opinions necessarily 
makes the less absolute opinions “narrower,” lower courts have concluded with surprising unanimity 
that Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), is the narrowest grounds.  
See, e.g., Dickens v. Brewer, 631 F.3d 1139, 1144–46 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Every circuit court that has 
considered a challenge to a lethal injection protocol following Baze has analyzed the protocol under the 
plurality’s substantial risk standard. . . . We are, therefore, in good company in holding that Baze 
plurality’s substantial risk standard is the controlling standard.”).  Notably, Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in Baze, while extreme, is not absolute.  Justice Thomas did not hold that any execution is 
constitutional (as Justices Brennan and Marshall had held that all executions were unconstitutional in 
Furman), rather he reasoned that an execution is constitutional unless it is deliberately designed to 
inflict torturous pain.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 94.  
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the legitimacy of Court.  The Marks rule responds to this potential crisis of 
legitimacy by holding that even non-majority decisions create binding 
federal precedent.
138
  And, by in large, it seems that the Marks rule has 
proved remarkably successful in preventing or defusing claims that 
pluralities undermine the credibility of our judicial process.  Indeed, 
popular accounts of famous pluralities scarcely mention that the cases were 
non-majority decisions, much less decisions of dubious precedential 
value.
139
  It is as though Marks assuages onlookers by assuring them that, 
even in the face of a non-majority decision, everything is functioning 
normally and that there was not a fundamental breakdown in the judicial 
process.  As a signaling mechanism, Marks has succeeded. 
As a practical matter, however, the legalistic narrowest grounds test 
overwhelmingly fails to create predictable precedent.  There is a 
dichotomy or separation between the Marks as promised and the Marks as 
applied.  As this Section demonstrates, the Supreme Court itself has 
signaled its approval of this separation by tolerating, and entrenching an 
application of Marks that is much less rigid and definitive than the 
legalistic narrowest grounds test would suggest. 
A.  Overview  
Because the “primary task of the Supreme Court is not to settle the 
disputes between the particular parties but to enunciate legal principles” for 
future disputes,
140
 it is conventional to understand precedent as flowing 
down from the high court to each of the lower state and federal courts.
141
  
But in the context of pluralities, the Marks rule notwithstanding, it seems 
that precedent flows upward.  The famous “narrowest grounds” language is 
increasingly nothing more than a meaningless talisman that is uttered by 
                                                                                                                          
138 See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
139 Even leading casebooks sometimes discuss plurality decisions in a manner that suggests that 
the absence of a majority does not impede the determination of the case’s precedential value.  See, e.g., 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 429 (1st ed. 2008)  (discussing a 
plurality decision, the casebook provides that in “Missouri v. Seibert, the Court held that subsequent 
statements must be excluded, even if Miranda warnings were given before the statements were 
repeated”); see also id. (suggesting that another plurality opinion in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 
630 (2004), produced an obvious and binding holding without so much as mentioning that the case was 
a plurality).  
140 Pamela C. Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality 
Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Corley, Uncertain Precedent].   
141 Countless commentators have remarked on the failures of pluralities to fulfill the Court’s law 
announcing function.  See, e.g., Plurality Decisions, supra note 80, at 1128 (“[T]he Court must provide 
definitive statements of the law. . . . [W]ithout a majority rationale for the result, the Supreme Court 
abdicates its responsibility to the institutions and parties depending on it for direction.  Each plurality 
decision thus represents a failure to fulfill the Court’s obligations.” (footnote omitted)).   
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courts before making an individualized assessment of the plurality 
decision’s precedential force in the lower courts.142  If lower courts settle 
on the holding of a Supreme Court plurality, then the Court is likely to 
embrace that as the law of the land.  Likewise, a lack of consensus suggests 
a lack of plurality precedent.  That is to say, lower court consensus or lack 
thereof might be understood as playing a critical, perhaps dispositive role 
in determining the meaning and scope of a plurality precedent.  In this 
way, I argue that the Supreme Court has managed to convey a confidence 
that even non-majority decisions produce regular and binding precedent 
while simultaneously devaluing the strict application of the Marks rule, 
which serves as the only tool for discerning such precedent.
143
   
This section discusses the three options available to the Supreme 
Court when the Court itself is forced to confront the precedential value of a 
prior plurality decision that bears on an issue presently before the Court:  
(1) the Court could simply ignore the Marks rule and refuse to provide a 
definitive resolution of the issue that previously produced a plurality—that 
is to say, the Court could defer to the status quo and refuse to offer a 
definitive holding as to the question at issue; (2) the Court could ignore the 
Marks rule entirely, but nonetheless reach majority agreement in a 
subsequent case as to the proper resolution of an issue that previously 
produced a plurality—that is, the Court could define a binding precedent 
but do so without reliance on the Marks doctrine; or (3) the Court could 
apply the Marks rule, which the Court has instructed is the proper 
mechanism for discerning precedent from a fragmented decision of the 
Court, and in the process provide lower courts with a template for 
understanding how the narrowest ground rule applies.  Since the Marks 
rule was announced in 1977, the Court has employed all three of these 
approaches in seeking to interpret its own prior plurality decisions.  As 
explained in the remainder of this section, although the Court’s approach to 
plurality precedent has been split among these three options, the 
cumulative effect is to entrench the view that plurality precedent is not 
actually precedent in any conventional sense; rather, although the dataset is 
small, it appears that plurality precedent flows upward.  That is to say, 
despite the external promise (conduct rule) that the plurality decision 
generated rigid precedent, the internal rule for lower courts (decision rule) 
is one of flexibility.  
                                                                                                                          
142 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (citation omitted). 
143 Stated another way, the narrowest grounds rule reflects a “rift between conduct rules” or 
messages for the general public and “decision rules” for the courts.  Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, 
supra note 19, at 648.   
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B.  Ignoring Marks and Refusing to Interpret the Plurality in Question 
One approach to interpreting a prior plurality is to simply ignore the 
plurality, and to explicitly refuse to determine what, if any, precedent the 
prior plurality generated.  In light of the Court’s Marks decision, it would 
seem that such an approach would represent outright defiance on the part 
of lower courts, particularly if the previous plurality addressed issues that 
are of central importance to the case at issue.   Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court itself has dealt with some prior plurality decisions in precisely this 
manner.  Of course, the Supreme Court is free to abandon or reconsider the 
Marks rule, but to insist that it is still precedential while ignoring the 
existence of the doctrine has cast Marks as a sort of shadow precedent—it 
exists in a sort of abdicated form that undermines generalized or absolutist 
claims of plurality precedent.       
By way of example, the Court was recently called upon to address 
whether the Fourth Amendment provides protections for public employees 
in their workspaces, an issue that was previously addressed in a plurality 
decision, O’Connor v. Ortega.144  In the O’Connor decision, there was 
widespread agreement among the Justices that “[i]ndividuals do not lose 
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government 
instead of a private employer,”145 but the Court was unable to achieve 
majority consensus as to the proper test for determining the extent to which 
the Fourth Amendment protects the workplaces of a public employee.
146
  
Whereas a four Justice plurality opinion reasoned that the determination of 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies so as to protect a public employee 
must proceed on a “case-by-case basis,”147 Justice Scalia concurred in the 
judgment but concluded that government employees generally enjoy the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment and that the case-by-case approach 
was inappropriate.
148
  In essence, the plurality opinion concludes that the 
Fourth Amendment applies less broadly to public employees such that 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy if you share space or allow 
access to other employees,
149
 and by contrast the concurrence called for a 
standard reasonable expectation of privacy analysis that is not watered 
                                                                                                                          
144 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
145 Id. 
146 See id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although I share in the judgment that this case should 
be reversed and remanded . . . I disagree . . . with the standard [the plurality] prescribes for the Fourth 
Amendment inquiry.”); id. at 748 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[B]y announcing in the abstract a 
standard as to the reasonableness of an employer’s workplace searches, the plurality undermines not 
only the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees but also any further analysis of the 
constitutionality of public employer searches.”).  
147 Id. at 718.  
148 Id. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
149 Id. at 717–18. 
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down by virtue of the fact that the employer happens to be a state actor.
150
  
In City of Ontario v. Quon,
151
 the question of whether a government 
employer’s search of a police officer’s text messages on a government 
pager implicated the Fourth Amendment was before the Court.
152
  The 
Court acknowledged the unfortunate reality that “[i]n the two decades 
since O’Connor, . . . the threshold test for determining the scope of an 
employee’s Fourth Amendment rights has not been clarified.”153  That is to 
say, the Court had before it a case squarely presenting an issue regarding 
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for public 
employees and the Court explicitly acknowledged that its plurality decision 
in this field had created lasting uncertainty as to the governing rule.  
Equally important, the application of the narrowest grounds formula to 
O’Connor is anything but straightforward;154 indeed, scholars have 
                                                                                                                          
150 Id. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Professor LaFave’s treatise summarizes the divide 
between the plurality and the concurrence as follows:   
In Ortega, the plurality opinion stated that “the question of whether an employee has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”  
Scalia, J. concurring, chided the plurality for not accepting the broader proposition 
“that the offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files 
within those offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general 
matter,” except in “such unusual situations” as where “the office is subject to 
unrestricted public access.”  The four dissenters (and thus a majority of the Court) 
expressed approval of this broader view. 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.4 n.87 
(4th ed. 2011) (citations omitted). 
151 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
152 Id. at 2624. 
153 Id. at 2628 (citing both the plurality opinion in O’Connor as well as Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence). 
154 The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit which has attempted to apply Marks to O’Connor, 
referring to the narrowest grounds formula and concluding that plurality approach controlled albeit 
without explaining why it was the narrowest grounds.  See United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 
1053 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that although “it is difficult to identify ‘that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds,’ . . . some propositions in 
O’Connor appear to be shared among all the concurring justices” (footnotes omitted)).  Other circuits 
that have agreed with the result do not even cite to Marks.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 
1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“O’Connor concerned ‘[p]ublic employees’ expectation of privacy in their 
offices, desks, and file cabinets.’”); Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he entire 
Court found a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the office desk and file cabinets.”); 
Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing O’Connor for the proposition that Fourth 
Amendment protection extends to searches and seizures not only by law enforcement authorities, but 
also by other government officials); Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 179 (1st 
Cir. 1997) (“O’Connor’s central thesis is that a public employee sometimes may enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his or her workplace vis-à-vis searches by a supervisor or other representative 
of a public employer.”).  Some of these circuits went on to apply the plurality’s balancing or “case by 
case” approach.  See Leventhal, 266 F.3d at 73 (“A public employer’s search . . . is ‘reasonable’ when 
 . . . [it is] ‘reasonably related to the objectives of the search and [is] not excessively intrusive.’” 
(quoting  O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion))); Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 179 (“[T]he 
objective component of an employee’s professed expectation of privacy must be assessed in the full 
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lamented that the application of the Marks rule here is apt to make one’s 
“head hurt.”155   
Accordingly, Quon presented the Court with an opportunity to resolve 
the “conflicting standards for judging the constitutionality of workplace 
searches” and, more importantly, the opportunity for the Court to elucidate 
on the precedential value of a plurality with no clear narrow grounds was 
squarely presented.
156
   
Rather than applying the Marks rule, or attempting to discern a 
narrowest grounds, or even attempting to determine whether O’Connor 
produced any binding precedent at all, the Court side-stepped the Marks 
issue.  The Court did not address, even obliquely, the issue as to which 
opinion, if any, from O’Connor was controlling as to the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment.
157
  Instead, the Court simply stated the obvious—the 
O’Connor opinion could be read as generating two different and oftentimes 
inconsistent views of the Fourth Amendment.  The precedential value of 
these two approaches was not discussed.
158
  Instead, the Court simply 
acknowledged that “[t]he two O’Connor approaches—the plurality’s and 
Justice SCALIA’s [sic] . . . lead to the same result” in the Quon case, and 
thus steadfastly refused to identify the controlling rule.
159
  After Quon, it is 
fair to say that there is more, not less confusion as to what is the narrowest, 
and controlling holding from O’Connor.160 
In light of the Supreme Court’s rules that specify that the Court’s 
purpose is not simply to resolve individual cases, but rather to elucidate 
general principles of national importance,
161
 it is noteworthy that the Court 
deferred a question of constitutional interpretation that has been lingering, 
                                                                                                                          
context of the particular employment relation.”).  The Seventh Circuit, without applying Marks, 
attempted to analyze which opinion is the controlling one in O’Connor.  See Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 
1201, 1203–04 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that although Justice Scalia’s approach adopted “arguably 
 . . . a less stringent standard than the plurality,” his approach did not differ significantly from the 
plurality’s, and the plurality’s reasonableness analysis was the controlling opinion).   
155 Orin Kerr, Will the Supreme Court Rethink Public Employee Privacy Rights in Quon?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14 2009, 10:00 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/12/14/will-the-
supreme-court-rethink-public-employee-privacy-rights-in-quon/ (“The question makes my head hurt.  
So courts have mostly just figured that four Justices is more than one and that they should follow the 
analysis in the concurring opinion.”). 
156  L. Camille Hebert, 1 EMP. PRIVACY LAW § 8A:4.  
157 See .Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628 (finding that “[i]t is not necessary to resolve whether” the 
plurality opinion of O’Connor is the controlling one). 
158 Id. at 2628–29. 
159 Id. at 2629. 
160 In Quon, the Court made comments like “[e]ven if the Court were certain that the O’Connor 
plurality’s approach were the right one,” which undermine any confidence or certainty that the plurality 
opinion is in fact the narrowest grounds.  Id. at 2630.  If the Court itself is not certain as to the 
narrowest grounds, there is no basis for a lower court to conclude that one opinion or another 
announces the holding of the Court.   
161 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
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unresolved for more than two decades.  If in circumstances such as those in 
Quon where the Court is unable or unwilling to discern the precedent from 
its own prior plurality decisions, then it seems unreasonable to expect that 
lower courts could or should rigidly apply the narrowest grounds test.
162
   
There are other examples where the precedential force of a prior 
plurality decision is at issue in a pending Supreme Court case, and the 
Court blithely ignores Marks and refuses to designate one opinion or 
another as controlling.
163
  The effect of these cases is to retain the plurality 
decision as the only precedent on the issue, but to refuse to determine 
which opinion or set of opinions from the plurality decision are binding.  
This sort of case strongly suggests that the Marks rule is not afforded the 
sort of binding precedent that normally accompanies a Supreme Court 
decision.
164
  If the Marks rule generated precedent, then surely these cases 
would follow the precedent, or overrule the precedent, or at the very least 
identify the precedent.  But cases such as Quon, in which Marks is merely 
ignored and there are no pronouncements on the precedential value of a 
                                                                                                                          
162 See, e.g., Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630 (analyzing the plaintiff’s claim under the plurality opinion’s 
approach); id. at 2633 (analyzing the claim under the rationale provided by the concurrence).   
163 Another example of this approach to plurality precedent is found in the Court’s recent case 
Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 32 (2011).  In Dixon, the Court was confronted with an issue that was 
addressed in a prior plurality, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and the Court applied the 
plurality by citing both the plurality and the concurring opinion as though, together, they create a 
patchwork of precedent that need not be carefully delineated.  See id. (“Under Seibert, this significant 
break in time and dramatic change in circumstances created a new and distinct experience, ensuring 
that Dixon’s prior, unwarned interrogation did not undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda 
warnings he received before confessing to Hammer’s murder.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  By citing simultaneously to both the plurality opinion and (as a see also) to Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, the Court altogether avoided the difficulty that lower courts have faced in 
attempting to discern the precedent from Seibert.  See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 
(1994) (declining to conduct a Marks analysis on the precedential value of Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 
U.S. 222 (1980), as not useful since “it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have 
considered it,” and summarily overruling Baldasar instead). 
164 One might be tempted to argue that this is simply a reasoned application of judicial 
minimalism urged by scholars like Cass Sunstein, who has advocated for courts to simply decide the 
case at hand without addressing non-essential legal issues.   CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1999).  But to the extent that judicial minimalism 
is designed to be democracy enhancing and to prevent judicial overreaching, settling an open dispute as 
to the scope of the Fourth Amendment that was created by the Court itself would seem desirable.  After 
all, if minimalism is preoccupied with allowing the “democratic processes room to maneuver,” then 
defining the scope of this Court created uncertainty as to the Constitution’s reach would seem 
desirable.  Id. at 54.  By failing to define the question of what its prior decision held, it seems overly 
charitable to understand the Court as having created more maneuverability for the democratic branches; 
there is something of mismatch in arguing that Sunstein’s narrowness principle can be applied to the 
narrowest grounds formula so as to suggest that ambiguous plurality precedent need not be sorted out.  
See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1023 (2005) 
(“Judicial minimalism often calls for narrow resolutions.  As Sunstein acknowledges, though, in some 
cases, ‘a wide rule, even if overinclusive and underinclusive, would be better than a narrow judgment,’ 
because . . . [a] legal regime that insisted that issues always be resolved as narrowly as possible might 
invite paralysis.”). 
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prior plurality, tend to undermine the authority of Marks as a general 
matter, and cast doubt on the value to lower courts of trying in earnest to 
discern a narrowest ground.  If the Supreme Court evades the most 
opportune moments to apply the Marks doctrine and expound on its 
application, then it is difficult to believe that lower courts will miss this 
signal.  It is unlikely that lower courts will aggressively enforce a 
precedent that the Supreme Court itself seems to be evading.   Of course, 
this is not to suggest that the Supreme Court is just a feckless victim of its 
own Marks rule.  Quite the contrary, there is good reason to believe that 
the Supreme Court accepts, even embraces the ambiguous model of 
precedent creation in this context; if the Court objected to the current 
framework, surely it would seize an opportunity like Quon not to evade 
Marks, but to overrule it.  While hardly conclusive, considered in light of 
the Court’s other approaches for dealing with plurality precedent, the 
decision to evade the Marks rule signals a decisional rule, or a rule for 
those applying Marks, that is not entirely consistent with the plain text of 
the Marks decision itself.     
C.  Ignoring Marks and Announcing a Majority Rule as to a Prior 
 Plurality 
Whereas Quon is indicative of an approach to plurality decisions that 
simply refuses to apply Marks and refuses to elucidate the binding 
precedent from a prior plurality, a second approach to addressing plurality 
precedent is for the Supreme Court to, again, ignore the Marks rule, but 
nonetheless generate a governing precedent as to the issue in question.  
This occurs when the Court refuses to apply a narrowest grounds analysis, 
but announces a holding as to an issue previously addressed in a Supreme 
Court plurality decision.  Without regard to the result the Marks rule may 
have dictated, such a decision reflects a majority consensus as to a legal 
issue in dispute.  In such circumstances, a prior plurality which has a 
debatable holding is of no consequence because a majority of the Court 
subsequently addresses the issue and announces majority support for one 
of the rationales advanced in the plurality—whether a particular opinion 
was the narrowest grounds or not, it is controlling if a majority of the Court 
eventually ratifies the reasoning.     
An infamous example of this approach to pluralities arises out of the 
Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane,165 which addresses the retroactivity of 
new rules of constitutional law.
166
  In Teague, the Court failed to obtain a 
majority test for determining whether a prisoner could benefit from a new 
rule of law.  Justice O’Connor wrote a four Justice plurality opinion as to 
                                                                                                                          
165 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
166 Id. at 294. 
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the critical issue, Justice White filed a separate concurrence, and Justice 
Stevens filed a separate concurrence.
167
  As to the judgment, then, the 
Court produced a 7-2 split,
168
 but the Members of the Court were unable to 
establish majority agreement as to a governing rationale.  At least initially, 
the lower courts appear to have split as to the governing holding of Teague.  
A formalistic application of the narrowest grounds test would suggest that 
Justice Stevens’s opinion was the narrowest, and therefore, controlling 
opinion insofar as the opinion merely called for a deference to prior 
precedent, and would not have developed new law on the issue.
169
  For 
example, the Eleventh Circuit observed:  
In Teague v. Lane . . . the United States Supreme Court 
identified the retroactivity doctrine to be applied where a new 
constitutional rule has been created after a defendant’s 
conviction became final. . . . Justices Stevens . . . concurred, 
and under the narrowest concurrence rule, that concurrence 
becomes the binding precedent of the Supreme Court.
170
   
This was not the only reading of Teague based on Marks, but it appears to 
be the most likely application of the narrowest grounds formula.   
Notably, however, rather than using Teague as an opportunity to 
elaborate on the meaning of the “narrowest grounds” test so as to 
demonstrate that the Marks formula is a real judicial precedent, the Court 
once again proceeded as though Marks was irrelevant.  The epilogue to the 
Teague saga has been a series of Supreme Court decisions that 
nonchalantly apply Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion without 
application, much less explanation, of the Marks rule.  That is to say, in the 
wake of Teague’s confusing plurality decision, a majority of the Court has 
coalesced around a single identifiable holding that now has obtained 
majority support without confronting Marks’s application.  Illustrative is 
the Court’s decision in Saffle v. Parks,171 which squarely presented a 
                                                                                                                          
167 Id. at 291. 
168 Justice Blackmun joined in part with the concurrence of Justice White and joined in part with 
the concurrence of Justice Stevens.  Id. 
169 See, e.g., Marceau, supra note 55, at 192 n.159 (citing a lower court decision which held, in 
Marceau’s words, that “under the narrowest grounds rule, Justice Stevens’ opinion is clearly the 
governing law, not the plurality opinion of Justice O’Connor”); Thurmon, supra note 82, at 441 
(identifying at least one lower court that concluded that “the concurrence by Justice Stevens and Justice 
Blackmun, stating a somewhat different test than the one formulated by the plurality, should be binding 
precedent” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Other commentators have recognized that, as a 
practical matter, Justice O’Connor’s approach was much more far-reaching and novel.  Marc E. 
Johnson, Everything Old Is New Again: Justice Scalia’s Activist Originalism in Schriro v. Summerlin, 
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 763, 767 (2005) (“[T]he aggressiveness with which Justice O’Connor’s 
plurality opinion sought to limit retroactivity marked a radical new direction in the Court’s habeas 
jurisprudence.”). 
170 Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541, 1543 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). 
171 494 U.S. 484 (1990). 
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question of retroactivity.
172
  Throughout Saffle, the majority acknowledges 
that Teague provides the governing framework, and in so doing provides 
pincites to Teague, all of which refer to Justice O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion.  However, none of the pincites so much as mention that Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion is not a majority decision, and not necessarily a 
narrowest grounds.
173
  Summarizing the judicial decision-making process 
in this field, one commentator has observed that “[a]lthough Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Teague was a plurality opinion, it has gained 
majority acceptance and is the retroactivity rule that controls today.”174   
The practical effect is a laudably clear statement of the law regarding 
retroactivity, and an utterly non-existent application of Marks.  The Court 
interpreted its own plurality decision without making any attempt to apply 
the Marks rule and, as a result, the law of retroactivity is settled and the 
technical narrowest grounds doctrine remains just as much a veil of 
judicial obfuscation as ever.  To an outsider, it may appear that pluralities 
are serving their function of creating binding, supreme law, but to the 
careful observer it seems that the Marks rule had nothing to do with the 
ultimate resolution of the question before the Court in Teague.  Leading 
treatises, courts, and scholars all refer to the general retroactivity doctrine 
as the “Teague rule,” by which they mean Justice O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion.
175
  All the while, however, the Marks rule has never been applied, 
or apparently even considered in this context.
176
  In practical effect, then, 
the Supreme Court speaking through a true majority announced that the 
O’Connor opinion from Teague would be the governing rule for 
retroactivity, and as such it is the governing rule.  The Marks rule had 
nothing to do with the determination, but because a majority of the Court 
has assented to this rationale it is now a binding precedent.    
Other examples of this non-Marks rule approach to pluralities 
abound—that is to say, it is not uncommon for the Court to ignore the fact 
that prior decisional law on the issue before the Court lacks a majority 
opinion, but to treat one of the opinions as binding precedent without 
                                                                                                                          
172 Id. at 485–86; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313–14 (1989) (discussing the 
difficulty in determining whether decisions such as Teague articulate new rules or simply apply “well-
established constitutional principle[s]” to cases that are “closely analogous to those which have been 
previously considered in the prior case law”). 
173 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 488–95 (showing that opinion does not explicitly state Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion was not a majority opinion). 
174 Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: 
A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. 
REV. 161, 189 (2005). 
175 BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
LITIGATION 430 (2012). 
176 A Westlaw search on December, 5, 2012 revealed that the Supreme Court has cited Teague in 
ninety-six cases, and has neither applied nor mentioned Marks in any one of them.  The search was run 
in the SCT database with the following parameters: (“Teague v. Lane” & “489 U.S. 288”). 
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applying the Marks rule.
177
  Such reasoning could be the result of 
carelessness or caprice on the part of the Court, but it is more likely 
indicative of a reasoned decision by the Court to adopt the path of least 
resistance in developing precedent.  If there exists new found majority 
agreement on a dispositive issue, then pains and perils of applying Marks 
may be regarded as an unnecessary burden.  After all, a holding of the 
court that the prior “opinion reasoning X” is the controlling opinion is the 
functional equivalent of holding that the “law is X,” regardless of whether 
the prior opinion was a majority, a concurrence, or a plurality.  By way of 
an additional example, although the governing opinion from an Eighth 
Amendment plurality decision, Harmelin v. Michigan,
178
 was still a 
debatable issue under Marks,
179
 the Supreme Court’s recent announcement 
in a majority decision that Justice Kennedy’s opinion was the “controlling 
opinion” stops the debate and compels the conclusion that Justice 
Kennedy’s reasoning now defines the constitutional scope of the Eighth 
Amendment.
180
  Simply put, once a majority agrees to a constitutional rule, 
that rule becomes law. 
                                                                                                                          
177 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 420–21 (1980) (plurality opinion) (indicating that 
there was no opinion of the court, only a plurality opinion written by Justice Stewart, and joined by 
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens).  The Court has consistently cited this plurality opinion as the 
holding of the Court, without ever applying the Marks formula.  See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 
451 (2005) (citing the Court’s plurality decision in Godfrey as if it were a majority decision without 
indication that it was such); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 530 (1997) (citing to the Court’s 
“holding” in Godfrey without indication that it was a plurality opinion).  Another example is Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 183 (1981).  There, a plurality of the Court held that a defendant 
accused of a violent crime could request to inquire into racial or ethnic prejudice if the defendant and 
the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups where there was reasonable possibility of 
prejudice.  Id. at 192.  The concurring Justices opined that an inquiry on voir dire as to racial or ethnic 
prejudice rested primarily with the trial court even in cases of violent crimes.  Id. at 195 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring).  The Court has subsequently cited the Rosales-Lopez plurality holding as the controlling 
opinion, without applying Marks.  E.g., Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422–23 (1991).  In fact, the 
Court has applied Marks to conduct a “narrow grounds” analysis only seven times. 
178 501 U.S. 957, 960 (1991) (including a plurality opinion by Justice Scalia, a concurrence in part 
by Justice Kennedy, and dissents by Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens). 
179 Hillary J. Massey, Note, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life 
Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1102 (2006) (“At least three circuit courts regard 
Justice Kennedy’s test as the rule of Harmelin because it is the position taken by those members who 
concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.”); Kevin White, Comment, Construing the Outer 
Limits of Sentencing Authority: A Proposed Bright-Line Rule for Noncapital Proportionality Review, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 567, 576–77 (2011) (“While the Court was able to form a majority rationale for 
why individualized sentencing considerations were not required in the noncapital context, five Justices 
were unable to agree on why the defendant’s proportionality challenge failed.” (footnote omitted)). 
180 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (“A leading case is Harmelin v. Michigan, in 
which the offender was sentenced under state law to life without parole for possessing a large quantity 
of cocaine.  A closely divided Court upheld the sentence.  The controlling opinion concluded that the 
Eighth Amendment contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly 
disproportionate to the crime.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Harmelin, 50 U.S. at 997, 1000–01 
(Kennedy, J., concurring))).  Prior to Graham, there was not a consensus among the circuits as  
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The Court’s decisions that develop and announce the precedent from 
a plurality opinion without any recourse to the Marks rule tend to erode 
confidence in the view that the Marks rule defines a hard and fast, always 
applicable test for discerning the holding of a plurality.
181
  Ignoring Marks 
and generating a constitutional rule, even more than ignoring Marks and 
refusing to define the constitutional rule, signals disinterest and disregard 
by the Court without the excuse of judicial minimalism.   Of course, even 
the existence of examples of the Supreme Court flagrantly bypassing and 
ignoring the Marks analysis does not, standing alone, justify the conclusion 
that the Marks inquiry is never, or rarely, required.  Indeed, it is arguable 
that the existence of non-Marks precedent elaboration in the plurality 
context simply reflects an idiosyncratic reaction to certain pluralities by the 
Court, or a recognition that applying the Marks rule is not always worth the 
headache if Court can otherwise generate majority consensus on the proper 
rule.  However, considered in conjunction with the Court’s own application 
of its Marks rule, discussed immediately below, the conclusion that the 
Marks rule is not precedential in any conventional sense, at least as it 
applies so as to create an internal or decisional rule, is forceful. 
D.   The Court’s Own Application of Marks: The Best Method for 
Understanding Marks 
Thus far I have provided examples of two separate approaches taken 
by the Supreme Court in applying one of its own prior plurality decisions.  
But these discussions have just provided examples of possible approaches 
to plurality precedent, and thus yield only impressionistic conclusions.  
That is to say, I have not surveyed every plurality decision and 
documented its treatment by the Court.  This part, by contrast, includes an 
exhaustive review of every case in which the Supreme Court attempts or 
purports to apply the Marks rule.
182
  It stands to reason that the most 
promising and definitive source of guidance as to the Marks rule’s 
application would be the Supreme Court’s own elaboration of the 
doctrine.
183
  The Court is not only the final arbiter of constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
to the precise impact or holding of the Harmelin decision.  See, e.g., Peter Mathis Spett, Confounding 
the Gradations of Iniquity: An Analysis of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Set Forth in Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 224–26 (1992–1993) (discussing the lack of consensus 
among the circuit courts). 
181 One could argue that these cases demonstrate that the Marks rule is precedent that binds the 
lower courts, but not the Supreme Court itself.  The Supreme Court has never explicitly embraced such 
an approach to plurality precedent.    
182 It is not an examination of the Court’s handling of every plurality decision, but rather an 
examination of every case in which the Supreme Court purports to apply or expressly refuses to apply 
Marks, as opposed to merely ignoring the doctrine.   
183 An equally strong signal about the flexibility that lower courts enjoy under Marks is sent by the 
Court’s approach to lower court applications of Marks.  That is to say, this Article focuses on the 
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questions but also the inventor of the Marks rule.  Significantly, an 
examination of the Court’s use of the rule supports the conclusion that the 
Marks rule is not capable of creating reliable precedent.  By examining 
every case in which the Supreme Court has applied the Marks rule in the 
context of interpreting one of its own prior pluralities, the claim that the 
narrowest grounds test does not impose any rigid decisional rules on lower 
courts is strongly corroborated.  The Marks rule, then, is precisely the sort 
of legalese that Dan-Cohen identified as producing “technical legal 
content” that is distinct from the publicly communicated message that 
pluralities always create identifiable precedent.
184
  Although the complete 
dataset is small, the available cases suggest that lower courts play an 
important role in defining the scope and application of prior Supreme 
Court plurality decisions.   
1.  Agreement Among Lower Courts  
As a general matter, the Supreme Court seems to place substantial 
value in allowing legal issues to percolate among the lower courts.  The 
Court does not have the resources to address every issue of constitutional 
and statutory interpretation, and thus the Court’s rules provide for Supreme 
Court review primarily when the lower courts have disagreed as to an 
important issue.  In this way, conventional appellate review consists of 
lower court percolation that culminates in a decision by the Supreme 
Court, which ends the judicial discussion.  By contrast, in the realm of 
plurality precedent, a more dialectic process seems to be emerging.
185
  
Under the limited class of cases in which the Court applies Marks there is 
often substantial deference shown to lower court agreement as to the 
precedent flowing from a prior plurality.
186
  It is as though the initial 
plurality frames the discussion, but does not end it, and lower courts are 
invited, indeed expected, to revisit the legal questions left unresolved in the 
                                                                                                                          
message sent to the lower courts by the Supreme Court’s application of the Marks rule, but future 
research should be done regarding the Court’s treatment of lower court Marks analysis.  My review of 
cases applying Marks suggests that the Court does not intervene to prevent lower courts from fumbling 
around with plurality precedent.  For example, there is a circuit split as to the proper application of the 
Rapanos plurality, but the Court has not shown any enthusiasm for intervening.  See infra notes 221–23 
and accompanying text. 
184 Dan-Cohen, Acoustic Separation, supra note 19, at 652 (noting that the same legal rule can 
simultaneously convey a message to the public through its ordinary language, and a different message 
to judges through its technical legal terminology).   
185 There is always room for interpretation and legal argument about the meaning of a Supreme 
Court opinion, but as to clear holdings there is no room for lower court flexibility and innovation.   
With plurality decisions, by contrast, there is no final, definitive word from the Court.  In this way, a 
plurality decision is more analogous to a concurring opinion inviting a prior precedent to be revisited.    
186 See, e.g., Bell v. Cone 543 U.S. 447, 451–52 (2006) (citing the Sixth Circuit’s application of 
the rule found in the plurality opinion of Godfrey to the case below). 
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plurality decision.
187
  Most notably, in circumstances where the lower 
courts have coalesced and identified a single holding from a plurality, the 
Court itself is loathe to disregard this consensus.
188
  In this way, the lower 
court application of the Marks rule tends to support the conclusion that 
precedent flows upward, from lower court agreement to the Supreme 
Court.   
Before proceeding too far along this path, it is worth pointing out that 
the claim of upward-flowing precedent is more a theory predicated on 
impressionistic data than a hard empirical fact.  The reason for this is that 
the Supreme Court has failed to apply its own Marks rule in enough cases 
to draw any absolute conclusions; indeed, since 1977 when Marks was 
decided, the Supreme Court itself has grappled with the application of the 
“narrowest grounds” rule to a prior plurality decision on only seven 
occasions.
189
  Given that there are hundreds of plurality decisions on all 
types of divisive issues,
190
 the Supreme Court’s ability to avoid the use of 
the Marks rule is itself notable.  The fact that it is considerably more 
common to ignore the Marks rule, as discussed in the previous sections—
either in announcing or in failing to announce plurality precedent—than it 
is for the Court to actually apply the doctrine, is certainly not the sign of a 
healthy and thriving precedent.  However, conclusions about the Court’s 
aspirations for the Marks rule as evidenced by the Court’s own use of 
Marks are subject to the caveat that the dataset is remarkably small.     
Nonetheless, I think there is value in examining in detail those seven 
instances where the Court has addressed the Marks rule in the context of 
discerning precedent from one of its prior pluralities.  Most strikingly, five 
of these seven cases follow a clear formula for applying Marks: where the 
application of Marks is ambiguous or disputed among the lower courts, 
there is no precedent, and where the lower courts are in consensus as to the 
                                                                                                                          
187 Of course there is always room for disagreement as to the meaning and scope of a Supreme 
Court decision.  Lower court disagreement as to the proper application of a Court decision is not 
limited to pluralities.  However, pluralities occupy an extreme position on the spectrum such that 
percolation is not only likely, but inevitable and desirable.   
188 See infra notes 191–97. 
189 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 948–49 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–
25 (2003); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 158–62 (1997); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9 
(1994); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743–45 (1994); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764–65 n.9 (1988).  There is one additional case where a plurality decision 
purports to conduct a Marks analysis, but the opinion is seeking to interpret whether and to what extent 
a separate concurrence is the holding of the Court in the decision at issue.  United States v. Santos, 553 
U.S. 507, 523–24 (2008).  In Santos, the plurality attempts to warn lower courts away from aspects of 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence by noting that the reasoning of Stevens’s concurrence is rejected by the 
“Justices joining this [plurality] opinion” and also the “Justices joining the principal dissent.”  Id. at 
524. 
190 Spriggs & Stras, supra note 17, at 519 (“[D]uring the 145 Terms between 1801 and 1955, the 
Supreme Court issued only [forty-five] plurality decisions.  However, during the [fifty-four] terms from 
1953 to 2006, the Supreme Court issued 195 plurality opinions.”). 
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proper application of Marks, the plurality is understood to have yielded 
binding precedent.
191
    
In three of the seven cases, the Court found virtually unanimous 
agreement among the lower courts as to the proper application of Marks to 
a prior precedent.
192
  In these circumstances, the Court applied the Marks 
rule so as to defend the lower court consensus as controlling.  By way of 
example, in Marks itself the Court reasoned that “every Court of Appeals 
that considered the question” agreed that the plurality opinion from a 
particular case was binding precedent, and therefore, the Court held that 
the opinion “was the law.”193  The Court explicitly linked lower court 
consensus as to the rule produced by a plurality to the conclusion that such 
lower court consensus announced the holding of the Supreme Court.  More 
recently, in rejecting a particular reading of a prior plurality under Marks, 
the Court emphasized that “[i]n any event, history has vindicated” the view 
that the plurality opinion was the controlling precedent insofar as hundreds 
of lower court decisions have so held.
194
  In other words, to the extent there 
was any doubt as to the narrowest grounds, the Court resolved the issue by 
referencing the lower court consensus as to the precedent generated by a 
prior plurality.
195
  Most recently, in Panetti v. Quarterman,
196
 the Court 
purported to apply the Marks rule when it announced the holding of a prior 
plurality regarding the execution of incompetent individuals.
197
  Notably, 
the view of the Eighth Amendment adopted by the Court was apparently 
unanimous among the lower courts who had considered the issue.
198
    
                                                                                                                          
191 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948–49 (discussing the precedent set by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399 (1986)); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322–25 (discussing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
(1978), where the Court “last addressed the use of race in public higher education”); O’Dell, 521 U.S. 
at 158–62 (discussing the plurality’s reliance on Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)); Nichols, 
511 U.S. at 743–45 (discussing that majority of the Court found “a prior uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction” constitutional in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)); City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 
764 n.9 (discussing the different interpretations of Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)). 
192 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 947; O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 166 n.3; City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 764 n.9. 
193 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977). 
194 City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 764 n.9 (“Clearly, in Kovacs the plurality opinion put forth the 
narrowest rationale for the Court’s judgment.”). 
195 Id. 
196 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
197 Id. at 949 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424–26 (1986)). 
198 E.g., Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 2006); Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 
1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003); Rohan ex. rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 809–11 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Scott v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 1011, 1013–14 (6th Cir. 2001); Lowenfield v. Butler, 843 F.2d 183, 187 
(5th Cir. 1988); see also Seeds, supra note 136, at 325 (compiling federal authorities that appeared to 
be unanimous in their endorsement of the conclusion that Justice Powell’s decision in Ford v. 
Wainwright was the narrowest ground and noting that Powell’s opinion was recognized as the holding 
of the Court).  Notably, Justice Powell’s opinion is regarded as the narrowest decision as to the 
procedural issue of how much process is needed to determine competency to be executed, but it is not 
regarded as the narrowest opinion as to the substantive standard regarding what constitutes 
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In short, where lower courts coalesce around a common interpretation 
of a plurality decision, the Court’s application of the Marks rule has served 
to solidify such an approach as the supreme law.  Notably, this upward-
flowing precedent model is primarily present when the Court itself relies 
on the Marks rule in announcing a holding.  By contrast, where the Court 
simply revisits the issue without citing Marks and arrives at a majority 
consensus as to an issue that previously produced a plurality, as with the 
retroactivity rule under Teague, then the Court’s law-announcing function 
is much more unilateral, or traditional, rather than dialectical.  In both 
contexts, the narrowest grounds test is of no discernible relevance. 
2.  A Lack of Consensus Among Lower Courts 
The upward-flowing precedent model obviously cannot generate 
precedent when there is no consensus among the lower courts.  Where the 
lower courts have divided substantially as to the proper application of the 
Marks rule to a particular plurality, and thus failed to coalesce around a 
single holding, the Supreme Court has generally opted to revisit the issue 
wholesale, and has rejected the notion that the prior plurality created any 
binding precedent at all.  That is to say, where the lower courts have failed 
to coalesce around an understanding of the plurality decision and there is 
no precedent that is available to flow upward, the Court is forced in the 
purest sense to apply its own intractable narrowest grounds formula.  There 
are two examples of Supreme Court decisions attempting to apply the 
Marks rule in the face of lower court disagreement as to the narrowest and 
binding opinion from a previous plurality.  Both of these cases support the 
conclusion that the Marks precedent is not binding on lower courts in any 
conventional sense.     
The first example is the lower court and subsequent Supreme Court 
treatment of the plurality decision in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke.
199
  In Bakke, the Court produced a plurality decision 
addressing the issue of affirmative action in medical school admissions,
200
 
and lower courts were completely divided as to the holding of the 
decision.
201
  For example, the Ninth Circuit, among others, held that the 
concurring opinion by Justice Powell that permitted race to play a role in 
                                                                                                                          
incompetence for purposes of an execution.  Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949; see also Seeds, supra note 136, 
at 325 n.69. 
199 438 U.S. 265, 267–68 (1978); see B. Andrew Bednark, Note, Preferential Treatment: The 
Varying Constitutionality of Private Scholarship Preferences at Public Universities, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
1391, 1398–99 (2001) (identifying a three-circuit split as to the controlling opinion in Bakke). 
200 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–70. 
201 Compare Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199–1201 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that an interest in facilitating diversity can satisfy strict scrutiny), with Hopwood v. Texas, 78 
F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an interest in facilitating diversity does not satisfy strict 
scrutiny), overruled by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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admissions was the governing precedent, and thus an interest in facilitating 
diversity could satisfy strict scrutiny.
202
  By contrast, other lower courts 
held that Bakke did not permit an interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause that would regard diversity as a compelling government interest.
203
  
In 2003, some twenty-five years after Bakke was decided, the Supreme 
Court resolved the substantive debate among the circuits about affirmative 
action in Grutter v. Bollinger
204
 by holding that diversity can constitute a 
compelling government interest.
205
  Notably, however, the Court did not 
address which opinion in the Bakke plurality was controlling, and instead 
suggested that the plurality may have failed to yield binding precedent.
206
  
The federal district court had concluded, in attempting to apply Bakke, that 
the “Marks framework cannot be applied to a case like Bakke,”207 and a 
majority of the Supreme Court apparently agreed.
208
  As the Court 
explained: 
In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have 
struggled to discern whether Justice Powell’s diversity 
rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no other 
Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under Marks. . . . 
We do not find it necessary to decide whether Justice 
Powell’s opinion is binding under Marks.209    
It is unconventional, to say the least, for the Supreme Court to hold 
that it is unnecessary for it to assess what binding precedent was generated 
by its prior decisions on a question directly before the Court.  Of course, 
the Court retains the power to distinguish its own precedent, or even 
overrule it,
210
 but to acknowledge its existence while failing to apply it is 
                                                                                                                          
202 Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199–1201. 
203 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 (“[T]here has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than 
Justice Powell’s lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state’s interest in diversity constitutes a compelling 
justification for governmental race-based discrimination.”). 
204 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
205 Id. at 343. 
206 See id. at 325 (declining to decide whether Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion is binding under 
Marks). 
207 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 847 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“[T]he various Justices’ 
reasons for concurring in the judgment are not merely different by degree, as they were in Memoirs, but 
are so fundamentally different as to not be comparable in terms of ‘narrowness.’”), rev’d, 288 F.3d 432 
(6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  The federal court of appeals reversed the district court, 
holding that “Justice Powell’s opinion is binding on this court under Marks . . . , and . . . Bakke remains 
the law until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 
2002); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321 (noting that the en banc court of appeals was divided as to the 
proper application of Marks to Bakke).   
208 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (declining to rely on or to pursue a Marks analysis of Bakke). 
209 Id. 
210 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 358 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the “Court 
must explain why [a] departure from the usual rule of stare decisis is justified” and that “constitutional 
precedent should be followed unless there is a ‘special justification’ for its abandonment”). 
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sui generis.  Indeed, the Court itself has developed a complicated 
algorithm for assessing whether, in an ordinary case, departing from stare 
decisis is permissible, and has explained that as a general matter the 
threshold and most important consideration in a case is identifying and 
applying binding precedent.
211
  Grutter’s handling of the Marks rule 
signals to lower courts and lawyers that the narrowest grounds formula is 
not to be regarded as a barrier to judicial flexibility.    
Similarly, in Nichols v. United States,
212
 the Court was forced to 
confront an issue about the scope of the right to counsel protections as they 
apply to sentence enhancements based on prior convictions.
213
  Of critical 
importance, the Supreme Court had addressed the exact same issue just 
over a decade earlier in a case called Baldasar v. Illinois.
214
   
Unfortunately, Baldasar was a plurality decision, and the lower courts had 
failed to reach even minimal consensus as to narrowest grounds of the 
decision.
215
  In fact, leading up to Nichols there was at least a three-way 
circuit split as to the binding precedent that had been generated by 
Baldasar.
216
  Faced with a deep circuit split as to the holding of its plurality 
decision in Baldasar, the Supreme Court concluded that Baldasar should 
be ignored, treated as a non-event, and revisited the issue de novo.
217
  In a 
particularly memorable passage the Court explained, “We think it not 
useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it 
has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered 
it.”218  The Court even went so far as to explain that the very “degree of 
confusion following a splintered decision such as Baldasar is itself a 
reason for reexamining that decision.”219  Accordingly, in the moments of 
greatest controversy as to the Marks precedent’s meaning and application, 
the Supreme Court simply avoids the doctrine altogether, and in the 
                                                                                                                          
211 See id. (explaining that relevant factors in determining whether a precedent can be overruled 
“include whether the precedent has engendered reliance, whether there has been an important change in 
circumstances in the outside world, whether the precedent has proved to be unworkable, whether the 
precedent has been undermined by later decisions, and whether the decision was badly reasoned.” 
(citations omitted)). 
212 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
213 Id. at 740. 
214 446 U.S. 222, 222 (1980) (considering whether the right to counsel is violated when a prior 
uncounseled conviction is used as the justification for an enhanced recidivist sentence), overruled by 
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).     
215 See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745 (observing a three-way circuit split among the lower courts as to 
the proper application of Baldasar). 
216 See id. (summarizing lower court treatment of Baldasar). 
217 See id. at 745–46 (questioning the helpfulness of the Marks inquiry in the context of 
Baldasar). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 746 (emphasis added). 
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process leaves the impression that lower courts are duty bound to do the 
same when complicated questions of interpretation arise.
220
   
As a result, one can feel confident that the next time lower courts split 
as to the holding of a plurality decision of the Supreme Court, the Court 
itself will side-step, evade, and further disavow the Marks rule, all the 
while maintaining the ruse that Marks provides a meaningful formula.  
Indeed, with regard to one of the more salient recent plurality decisions, 
Rapanos v. United States,
221
 some lower courts are explicitly concluding 
that the Marks rule is entirely inapplicable.
222
  When lower courts do not 
agree about the precedent provided by a plurality, the Court’s decisions 
that apply Marks suggest that there is no precedent.
223
  
3.  Outliers in the Realm of Plurality Precedent 
As discussed immediately above, of the seven instances where the 
Court has discussed the Marks rule in attempting to discern its own 
precedent, five of these instances follow a distinctive pattern of holding 
that precedent exists if, and only if, the lower courts have reached 
consensus as to the holding of the Supreme Court—that is to say, 
precedent rises to the Supreme Court out of unanimity among the lower 
courts, and precedent does not exist if there is no lower court consensus.
224
  
But to suggest that two of the seven instances where the Court itself has 
applied Marks undermine this conclusion is to dramatically understate the 
upward-flowing precedent conclusion.   
                                                                                                                          
220 See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 82, at 441–42 (examining Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), 
and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and concluding that “[l]ower courts should take the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of the Marks rule as an invitation to follow suit”). 
221 547 U.S. 715, 718 (2006). 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Nichols and 
Rapanos and concluding that the Court has distanced itself from Marks in recent years). 
223 Alternatively, one could conclude that the reason Marks is not applied in cases like Nichols or 
Grutter is that it cannot be applied—that is, there is not a narrowest ground.  If Marks does not have 
application, then, of course, it cannot be applied.  Perhaps there is no lower court consensus only 
because there is no discernible way to apply the Marks rule.  The problem with such reasoning, 
however, is that it is a gap that threatens to swallow the rule.  As previously explained, even the 
supposedly paradigmatic examples of narrowest grounds, like Furman, are not without controversy.  
See supra Part III.B.4.  There is nearly always room to disagree about what is the narrowest ground, 
and because the Court refuses to provide guidance as to its application, explaining circuit court 
disagreement as a product of the inapplicability or confusion surrounding Marks seems unsatisfactory.  
Moreover, the goal of this Article is to celebrate the indeterminacy of Marks.  Other scholars have 
already catalogued and lamented the confusion surrounding the Marks rule.  See, e.g., Thurmon, supra 
note 82, at 419–21 (criticizing the Marks rule as a failure).  The purpose of this Article is to show that 
the indeterminacy in this realm actually has salutary effects.  This is not to say that the acoustic 
separation model is the only way of conceiving of Supreme Court precedent.   
224 See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing the lack of consensus among the lower courts). 
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One of the cases that does not necessarily appear to follow the mode 
of upward-flowing precedent described above is O’Dell v. Netherland.225   
In O’Dell, the Court considered whether the prior plurality in Simmons v. 
South Carolina,
226
 which required that a defendant be permitted to inform a 
jury that he is ineligible for parole when the prosecution is seeking the 
death penalty based on the defendant’s future dangerousness, applied 
retroactively.
227
  O’Dell argued that because he was parole ineligible, but 
was barred from informing the jury of this fact in order to rebut the 
prosecutor’s arguments regarding his future dangerousness, his death 
sentence violated due process.
228
  More specifically, O’Dell is a case in 
which the Court assessed whether a plurality decision, Simmons, 
interpreting and applying a previous plurality decision, Gardner v. 
Florida,
229
 was retroactively applicable to a conviction that was already 
final.
230
  The question before the Court as it related to Marks was whether 
the Simmons plurality’s application of a legal principle broke new ground 
so as to bar retroactivity, or instead whether the legal principle applied by 
the plurality was sufficiently well established (by a previous plurality) so 
as to justify the application of the Teague bar.
231
  Applying Marks, the 
Court held that the plurality decision in Gardner did not lead naturally and 
“ineluctably” to the result in the Simmons plurality; thus, the Simmons 
decision was a new rule that did not automatically apply retroactively.
232
  
The Marks analysis is cursory, but as relevant for present purposes, the 
Court’s interpretation of Gardner, does not rely on any consensus or 
dissensus among the lower courts in defining the narrowest grounds of 
Gardner.
233
  However, the failure to explicitly apply the upward-flowing 
precedent model in this context is probably not determinative for a variety 
of reasons.       
As an initial matter, upon considering the role of Marks when there 
are pluralities layered on top of pluralities, one is confronted with the 
                                                                                                                          
225 521 U.S. 151, 162 (1997) (conducting its own Marks analysis on Gardner without any 
reference to relevant lower court decisions).  As an aside, even if Marks creates binding precedent as a 
general matter, it is not obvious that such holdings are clearly established enough to justify habeas 
relief for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
226 512 U.S. 154 (1994). 
227 O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 153. 
228 Id. at 155, 159. 
229 430 U.S. 349, 360–62 (1977) (concluding that a death sentence from a judge who had reviewed 
a presentence report that was not made available to the defendant violated due process because the 
sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which the defendant had no 
opportunity to deny or explain). 
230 O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 161–62. 
231 Id. at 156. 
232 Id. at 162. 
233 See id. at 160–62 (taking Justice White’s narrow opinion as to the rule of Gardner without 
reference to lower court analysis). 
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problem of lacking any solid ground upon which to assess the Court’s 
analysis—it is reminiscent of the old problem of turtles all the way 
down.
234
  The limited Marks inquiry is at least two steps attenuated: the 
defendant was relying on one plurality, which applied a second plurality, 
and the Court conducted a Marks analysis of this second plurality.
235
  
Similarly, it must be noted that the majority’s analysis in O’Dell was hotly 
contested by a four Justice dissent that accuses the majority of 
manipulating the Marks rule.
236
  More importantly, it is worth pointing out 
that the Teague doctrine, the application of which is the central issue in 
O’Dell, is a procedural vehicle designed to facilitate principles of comity 
and federalism by regularly limiting the access of state prisoners to federal 
habeas relief.
237
  Accordingly, it is not entirely surprising that when the 
Court was tasked with applying the Teague rule to an ambiguous situation, 
the prisoner’s urged application of the Marks rule did not prevail.238  That 
is to say, the O’Dell decision says more about the spirit of Teague’s 
limitations than it does about the Marks doctrine.  Moreover and closely 
related, O’Dell represents such a uniquely perfect procedural storm as to 
defy generalizations about plurality precedent.  The applicability of 
Teague, whether to a plurality or not, is at least one complicated procedural 
step removed from the strict application of Marks rule itself.  Accordingly, 
the question of whether one plurality’s interpretation of a previous plurality 
breaks new ground for purposes of Teague is simply too unique to draw 
generalizable conclusions.  It would be odd to draw conclusions about the 
application of Marks from a single decision that is applying a procedural 
framework—the Teague doctrine—that is itself almost unrivaled in its 
complexity.   
                                                                                                                          
234 See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988) (describing the turtle 
problem). 
235 See O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 160–62 (discussing and analyzing the petitioner’s reliance on the 
plurality opinions of Simmons and Gardener). 
236 See id. at 174–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority makes much of the fact that the 
[Gardner plurality] opinion was joined by only three Justices, and instead of accepting the plurality’s 
due process analysis as the rule of Gardner, the Court takes Justice White’s concurring opinion, which 
was grounded in the Eighth Amendment, as expressing the holding of the case.  The Court’s reading of 
Gardner ignores the fact that Justice White himself squarely adopted the due process holding of 
Gardner.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 175–76 (arriving at a fundamentally different conclusion as to the 
proper application of Marks to the Gardner plurality). 
237 See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1703, 1714 (2000) (“The 
underlying rationale of Teague is that considerations of finality and comity at some point override an 
individual accused’s claim.”); Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity 
Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 203, 244 (2001) (“[T]he importance of comity as an underlying value of Teague and the 
current federal habeas statute cannot be underestimated.”).  
238 See O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 162 (rejecting the petitioner’s Marks application). 
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There is only one other Supreme Court decision that attempts to 
engage in a Marks rule analysis: Romano v. Oklahoma.
239
  While the 
Romano decision does not fit squarely within the upward-flowing 
precedent model, it also does not undermine this conceptual framework.
240
  
Specifically, although in Romano the Court purported to announce a 
holding based on Marks without explicitly considering lower court 
consensus on the issue, in reality the Court simply relied on a prior 
majority decision which had already interpreted the plurality.
241
  More 
precisely, although Romano is one of the small handful of seven cases in 
which the Court cites and purports to apply the Marks standard,
242
 as a 
practical matter the Court was simply accepting what a previous majority 
of the Court had considered to be the precedential reasoning of a prior 
plurality decision.
243 
  A more detailed analysis of Romano demonstrates 
why this is the case. 
In Romano, the Court was considering whether the admission of 
evidence of a defendant’s prior death sentence at a capital sentencing 
hearing violated the constitutional principle announced in the Court’s prior 
Eighth Amendment decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi.
244
  In Caldwell, 
there was majority agreement as to the judgment, and majority agreement 
for the view that the responsibility of the jury for the death sentence was 
reduced by the prosecutor’s statements that were neither accurate nor 
relevant to the sentencing.
245
  The plurality opinion, however, went one 
step farther and concluded that even if the information provided to the jury 
had not been inaccurate, if it lessened the jurors’ sense of responsibility, it 
was inadmissible.
246
  Justice O’Connor, writing for herself, concurred and 
disagreed only with the latter conclusion, a conclusion that was irrelevant 
to the judgment in Caldwell—that is, Justice O’Connor reasoned that only 
if the jury’s sense of responsibility was diminished with inaccurate and 
misleading information was the constitution offended.
247
  In short, both the 
                                                                                                                          
239 512 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1994) (considering whether the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior 
death sentence violated the constitutional principle announced in the plurality opinion of Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)).    
240 See id. (applying the Marks rule without reference to lower court interpretations, and instead 
relying on the plurality opinion in Caldwell). 
241 See id. (arriving at its conclusion in part by its analysis of Caldwell). 
242 See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing the seven cases in which the Court cited Marks). 
243 See Romano, 512 U.S. at 8–10 (discussing its rule from Caldwell). 
244 Id.; Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 335–36 (1985). 
245 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 335–36.  As an aside, the Romano Court refers to Caldwell as a plurality 
decision warranting an application of the Marks rule.  Romano, 512 U.S. at 9.  Given the Court’s 
parsimonious application of the Marks rule—only seven attempts to apply it by the Court in thirty-five 
years—Caldwell is an odd choice for its selective application insofar as Caldwell is not a traditional 
plurality because there is majority agreement as to most of the reasoning in the decision.  Caldwell, 472 
U.S. at 323, 341. 
246 Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 336. 
247 Id. at 342 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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plurality and Justice O’Connor’s opinion agreed that the prosecutor’s 
conduct in Caldwell unconstitutionally minimized the responsibility of the 
sentencing jury—they agreed on the resolution and holding of the case248—
but Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurrence to urge a narrower 
vision of the legal reasoning upon which the case rested.
249
  In Justice 
O’Connor’s view, only misleading statements about the role of the 
sentencing jury in the death determination could give rise to a 
constitutional injury under the Eighth Amendment.
250
  The question, then, 
is whether Justice O’Connor’s concurrence provides a controlling 
statement of Eighth Amendment law on this issue.         
In the wake of the Caldwell decision, lower courts addressing the 
case’s precedential value did not distinguish between the plurality opinion 
and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence; instead, the lower courts, without so 
much as conducting a Marks analysis tended to cite Caldwell generally for 
the proposition that comments designed to diminish juror responsibility 
were not permitted.
251
  Subsequently, however, in Darden v. 
Wainwright,
252
 a majority of the Court stated that Caldwell’s holding is 
only applicable to a small class of prosecutor comments, to wit, “those that 
mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows 
the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing 
decision.”253  In other words, Darden treated as precedential only Justice 
O’Connor’s gloss on the majority decision.  The Darden decision’s 
discussion of Caldwell does not refer to Caldwell as a plurality, it does not 
apply the Marks rule, and it does not even cite to Marks.
254
  Nonetheless, in 
light of the Darden decision’s discussion of Caldwell, by the time the 
Court decided the Romano case, the Marks formula was largely beside the 
point because a majority of the Court in Darden had already recognized a 
reading of Caldwell that foreclosed relief in Romano.
255
  Viewed in this 
light, Romano is nothing more than an example of a case in which a 
previous majority of the Court had agreed to a particular reading of a 
plurality.    
                                                                                                                          
248 Id. at 335–36, 342. 
249 See id. at 343 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the prosecutor’s comments distorted the 
jury’s understanding of its responsibility in deciding the death sentence). 
250 Id.  
251 See Dutton v. Brown, 788 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1986) (discussing Caldwell as inapplicable 
to prosecutor statements that called the jury “part of a process”); Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 
272, 284 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding a prosecutor’s comments did not shift the jury’s burden as they did in 
Caldwell); Moore v. Blackburn, 774 F.2d 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying a stay of execution after 
concluding the jury knew its responsibility in accordance with Caldwell). 
252 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
253 Id. at 184 n.15 (emphasis added).   
254 See id. (demonstrating that there is no mention of a plurality). 
255 Id. (adopting Justice O’Connor’s formulation in Caldwell); see also Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 
U.S. 1, 9 (1994) (discussing the O’Connor concurrence as controlling). 
 986 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:933 
Consequently, the decision in Romano is not inconsistent with the 
framework of upward-flowing precedent.  Instead, it is simply an 
additional example of the principle that when a majority of the Court 
agrees on a rationale that was previously advanced in an opinion within a 
plurality decision, that majority agreement is binding law.  Whether 
attributed to shifting ideologies among the Justices, changes in the 
composition of the Court, or carelessness as to the application of a plurality 
decision, once there is majority agreement on a legal conclusion, even if 
that conclusion had previously divided the Court in a plurality decision, 
that principle becomes binding law.  In this regard, Romano merely tends 
to confirm the view that plurality precedent reflects, at best, lower court 
consensus, and at worst, the unpredictable and untethered ability of the 
Supreme Court to decide issues considered in previous pluralities without 
the encumbrances of prior precedent.
 256
   
The Supreme Court’s own interpretation of the Marks rule suggests 
that the doctrine is more a call for intra-judicial communication between 
the various levels of courts than a definitive statement of binding 
constitutional law.
257
  While the dataset is small, the Court’s application of 
its Marks precedent suggests that the role of lower courts in applying 
plurality precedent is much more dialectic, and much less a top-down 
application of legal principles.  As a general rule, where lower courts have 
been unified in their approach to interpreting a plurality, the Supreme 
Court has used the Marks rule to endorse such interpretations and imbue 
them with constitutional authority.  Likewise, where the lower courts have 
substantially disagreed as to the controlling opinion, the Supreme Court 
has suggested that the prior plurality did not generate a controlling opinion 
under Marks.   
The goal of the foregoing analysis, then, is to expose the Marks rule 
for what it is: a ruse, a deception, a pretend precedent, a rule designed to 
                                                                                                                          
256 To the extent that the Supreme Court announces that a particular opinion is the controlling 
opinion of a plurality decision, lower courts would, of course, be bound to apply said opinion as 
binding law.  In this regard, one could predict that there would be majority consensus among the 
circuits as to the precedential value of the plurality because there is Supreme Court precedent from a 
majority interpreting the plurality.   
257 Certainly, in the context of majority opinions, there are countless examples of the Supreme 
Court reasserting its authority and reversing lower courts when the state or lower federal court judges 
seem overly dismissive of the Court’s pronouncements of law.  A famous example from recent years is 
the Court’s habit of reviewing federal habeas cases where relief was granted in the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals.  The Supreme Court has reversed, sometimes summarily and sometimes in harshly worded 
opinions, when a majority of the Justices regard the circuit court as disregarding the Court’s precedent 
as to the limited scope of review under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.  See, e.g., 
Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740 (2011) (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas 
corpus); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011) (holding that the Ninth Circuit overstepped 
its authority in reviewing the lower court’s judgments in habeas corpus actions); Woodford v. Visciotti, 
537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s review of the California Supreme 
Court’s understanding of California law). 
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shape the views and conduct of the public alone, and a rule that has very 
little practical effect on the way that plurality precedent ought to be 
discerned by lower courts.  In short, lower courts must exercise prudence 
in taking the Marks rule’s symbolic promise of ever present precedent too 
seriously.  The Marks rule is only able to harmonize the dueling goals of 
public legitimacy and judicial flexibility if lower courts are sensitive to the 
more subtle decisional rule signaled by the Court’s own application of the 
narrowest grounds test.  At the very least, Marks must be understood as 
affording a margin of discretion and innovation to lower courts.  When the 
Court itself has generated a particularly confusing and fractured plurality 
decision, there is room for precedent to flow in an upward direction and for 
lower courts to innovate, at least before the Court itself revisits the 
issues.
258
      
V.  THE SUCCESS OF THE ACOUSTIC SEPARATION:  AN EXAMINATION OF 
MARKS IN THE LOWER COURTS  
The Supreme Court’s seeming indifference to its own Marks rule 
strongly supports the conclusion that the Marks rule is not, in any ordinary 
sense, a binding precedent.  The treatment of plurality decisions by federal 
circuit courts tends to confirm that lower courts have received this 
message.  The lower courts rarely apply the narrowest grounds test in the 
first place, and even when they do apply it, they rarely agree as to its 
proper application.  One circuit recently concluded that the Supreme Court 
seems to be moving “away from the Marks formula.”259  All of this, then, 
raises a foundational question: Does a precedent for discerning precedent 
from plurality decisions retain precedential value if lower courts are unable 
or unwilling to consistently apply it?
 260
  Certainly not, at least in the 
conventional sense we have come to understand precedent.
261
     
                                                                                                                          
258 See Seeds, supra note 136, at 336 (“It may be that the Court implicitly relies on a practical 
exception to the Marks rule: where the Court’s statement on an issue is not clear, where there is no 
clear rule, the Marks doctrine is moot.”). 
259 United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1220 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The First Circuit concluded 
that its approach was therefore ‘particularly sound given that the Supreme Court itself has moved away 
from [rigid application of] the Marks formula.’” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 
(1st Cir. 2006))).  
260 This is reminiscent of the quarrel about trees falling in a remote forest.  CHARLES RIBORG 
MANN & GEORGE RANSON TWISS, PHYSICS 235 (rev. ed. 1910); see also GEORGE BERKELEY, THREE 
DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS 20 (1969) (discussing the philosophy behind 
perception). 
261 In recent years, the Court has altered its course and revised judicially created doctrines when 
lower courts develop a consensus that the practice is too difficult or time consuming.  See, e.g., Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009) (reversing its prior order of decision-making precedent, in 
part because lower courts had objected to the rule as unnecessarily complicated and a strain on judicial 
resources). 
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There are a few objective indictors suggesting that the acoustic 
separation is succeeding in this realm insofar as the lower courts have 
come to regard the Marks rule as, at best, a fleeting and unpredictable 
source of precedent.  Most notably, political scientist Pamela Corley 
recently published an empirical study of the treatment of plurality 
decisions in the lower courts, in which she found that a “plurality decision 
is not perceived [by lower court judges to be] as authoritative as a majority 
decision.”262  The crux of Corley’s analysis is review of the citation history 
for Supreme Court plurality decisions.
263
  By considering negative citing 
references through Shepard’s, the study found that plurality decisions, 
accounting for other variables, are about forty-two percent more likely to 
receive negative treatment among the lower courts than a majority 
decision.
264
  Equally revealing, the plurality opinions received positive 
treatment or reliance in almost thirty percent fewer cases than majority 
decisions.
265
   
In sum, Corley’s study strongly supports the conclusion that the 
Marks rule, as a decisional rule, is not regarded as truly binding precedent 
by lower courts.
266
  Contrary to the plain language of the Marks rule, and 
despite the lack of any effort by the Court to overrule Marks, the force and 
applicability of the precedent generated by a plurality is substantially less 
than that of an ordinary decision.  Notably, however, Corley’s study is 
limited to the citation history for Supreme Court pluralities—that is to say, 
she does not look at the actual discussion of plurality precedent in the 
circuit courts.
267
  Undertaking to consider how circuit courts have 
responded to every plurality of the Supreme Court post-Marks would be a 
daunting task that no researcher has yet confronted.  However, more  
in-depth consideration of a couple of examples of prominent plurality 
decisions in the field of constitutional criminal procedure provides 
anecdotal support for Corley’s conclusion.   
A first and useful example is the Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in 
Florida v. Riley.
268
  In Riley, the Court considered an issue that is now 
standard fare in nearly every criminal procedure textbook across the 
country: To what extent can the police engage in aerial surveillance of 
one’s home and yard from a helicopter?269  Unfortunately, this threshold 
question of Fourth Amendment law was unable to garner a majority 
                                                                                                                          
262 Corley, Uncertain Precedent, supra note 140, at 40. 
263 Id. at 36. 
264 Id. at 37, 43. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 31 n.1, 44. 
267 Id. at 36. 
268 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (plurality opinion); see id. at 455 (holding that police do not need a 
search warrant for conducting aerial observations at 400 feet and above). 
269 Id. at 447–48. 
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opinion.
270
  A four-Justice plurality opinion was authored by Justice White 
who, in practical effect, reasoned that any aerial surveillance is lawful for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment so long as the police fly their aircraft 
in a manner and at an altitude that is lawful.
271
  As the plurality noted, “We 
would have a different case if flying at [400 feet] had been contrary to law 
or regulation.”272  Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment but not in 
the reasoning of the plurality and concluded that the proper inquiry is not 
whether the police flights were merely legal, but whether the helicopter in 
question was at a location and altitude which “members of the public travel 
with sufficient regularity” so as to deprive one of any reasonable 
expectation of privacy on the land in question.
273
  Notably, Justice 
O’Connor concurred only in the judgment and specifically rejected the 
plurality’s approach, explaining that such a standard “rests the scope of 
Fourth Amendment protection too heavily on compliance with FAA 
regulations.”274  Accordingly, Riley presents a legally significant 
question—the scope of Fourth Amendment limits on aerial surveillance—
in a non-majority decision, and there is a material disagreement between 
the Justices who concurred in the judgment.
275
  Equally significant, Riley 
presents what appears to be a relatively straightforward application of 
Marks because Justice O’Connor’s concurrence does not announce a new 
test of general applicability, but rather announces a narrower preference for 
applying the well-established principles of Fourth Amendment law.
276
  In 
other words, Riley is a plurality decision for which the narrowest grounds 
is unusually straightforward.  
Since it was decided, the Riley decision has been cited in fifty circuit 
court decisions.
277
  Incredibly, not a single one of these federal decisions 
has cited the Marks rule, or even purported to apply a narrowest grounds 
approach.  Among these federal decisions, several circuits rely on the 
concurrence by Justice O’Connor as though it is the governing 
precedent.
278
  Many other circuit court cases rely primarily or exclusively 
                                                                                                                          
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 451–52 (plurality opinion). 
272 Id. at 451.  The final paragraph of the plurality opinion suggests that in addition to the legality 
of the flight, other considerations such as the amount of noise and dust, and whether intimate details are 
detected, might also be relevant to the question of whether an illegal search has occurred.  Id. at 452. 
273 Id. at 454–55 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
274 Id. at 452 (plurality opinion). 
275 Id. at 447–48. 
276 See id. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that aerial observations below 400 feet 
could violate privacy rights). 
277 A Shepard’s Report compiled on December, 5, 2012 showed that federal circuits have cited 
Riley fifty times.    
278 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 559 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing what level of 
visibility of an act denies privacy protection against police surveillance), cert. denied, 131 S.  Ct. 1584 
(2011); United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding surveillance conducted 
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on the plurality opinion as precedent.
279
  But none of the decisions citing to 
Riley base the determination as to the decision’s holding on an application 
of the Marks rule.   
A recent example of a lower court relying on O’Connor’s concurrence 
in Riley as precedent is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Maynard,
280
 which held that the warrantless GPS surveillance of the 
defendant’s car for a month violated the Fourth Amendment.281  In a 
subsection of the opinion entitled relevant “precedent,” the circuit court 
provides a detailed analysis of Riley, stating in part:   
In considering whether something is “exposed” to the public 
as that term was used in Katz we ask not what another person 
can physically and may lawfully do but rather what a 
reasonable person expects another might actually do. . . . 
Indeed, in Riley, Justice O’Connor, whose concurrence was 
necessary to the judgment, pointed out: “Ciraolo’s 
expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the 
airplane was operating where it had a ‘right to be,’ but 
because public air travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently routine 
part of modern life that it is unreasonable for persons on the 
ground to expect that their curtilage will not be observed 
from the air at that altitude.  If the public rarely, if ever, 
travels overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot be 
said to be from a vantage point generally used by the public 
                                                                                                                          
below 400 feet to be legal because it is common for a helicopter to fly at this altitude); United States v. 
Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (considering the altitude of surveillance in determining 
whether it was legal); United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1262 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(comparing the use of thermal surveillance equipment to an aerial reconnaissance conducted at 
uncommon altitude); United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding 
observations made through a wire roof could reasonably be anticipated to be similar to observations 
from reasonable altitudes).  
279 United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 281 (7th Cir. 2011) (considering to what extent 
reasonable expectations of aerial surveillance equate to searches of the home), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1534 
(2012); United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 434–35 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding an aerial surveillance 
followed applicable aviation laws and regulations, and therefore does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing visibility in relation to 
what is in public view); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing 
expectations of privacy involving thermal imaging); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 
1994) (discussing whether thermal imaging of home caused any nuisance); United States v. Ramo, 961 
F.2d 217, at *2 (9th Cir. May 1, 1992) (unpublished table decision) (finding defendant could not prove 
a police helicopter had violated FAA regulations); United States v. Saltzman, 932 F.2d 970, at *3 (6th 
Cir. May 13, 1991) (unpublished table decision) (concluding the amount of disturbance from an aerial 
surveillance should have been considered to determine if it was a lawful search); Van Strum v. Lawn, 
927 F.2d 612, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1991) (unpublished table decision) (determining helicopter 
surveillance was a privacy violation in part because it endangered their family and property).   
280 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
281 Id. at 559, 561–62, 568. 
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and Riley cannot be said to have ‘knowingly expose[d]’ his 
greenhouse to public view.” . . . Applying the foregoing 
analysis to the present facts, we hold the whole of a person’s 
movements over the course of a month is not actually 
exposed to the public because the likelihood a stranger would 
observe all those movements is not just remote, it is 
essentially nil.
282
 
Without so much as a mention of Marks, the federal court concluded 
that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is precedential.283  Other circuits have 
agreed with this conclusion on the merits, but have failed to provide further 
reasoning or analysis to support the conclusion.
284
  But the lack of analysis 
should not be mistaken for consensus.  Other circuit court decisions have 
unequivocally concluded that the plurality opinion is the authoritative 
precedent in Riley.  For example, in discussing a Fourth Amendment claim, 
the Eleventh Circuit referred exclusively to the plurality opinion in Riley 
and noted that the Supreme Court had held that it was relevant to 
determining that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated that “no 
intimate details connected with the use of the home” were revealed.285  
Only the plurality decision in Riley makes any reference to the idea that the 
nature of the revealed details might be relevant to the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment protections.
286
  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has noted that an 
appropriate Fourth Amendment analysis of an aerial surveillance must 
consider the “height of, and disturbance caused by the helicopter,” which 
are also unmistakably aspects of the plurality decision alone and are not 
part of the reasoning announced in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.287   
                                                                                                                          
282 Id. at 559–60 (citation omitted). 
283 Id. 
284 See, e.g., United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a helicopter 
flying below 400 feet did not violate one’s “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy”); United States v. 
Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a manager’s observations did not violate 
privacy expectations); United States v. Saltzman, 932 F.2d 970, at *3 (6th Cir. May 13, 1991) (per 
curiam) (unpublished table decision) (explaining that it was “apparent” that lower court had not 
properly conducted a Riley analysis insofar as the court failed to consider, among other things, the 
“frequency of helicopter flights in the area”). 
285 United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994). 
286 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989). 
287 United States v. Saltzman, 932 F.2d 970, at *3 (6th Cir. May 13, 1991) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision) (noting that the height and amount of disturbance are an “integral part of 
fourth amendment analysis”); see also United States v. Ramo, 961 F.2d 217, at *2 (9th Cir. May 1, 
1992) (analyzing the legality of aerial surveillance by considering, among other factors, the fact that the 
helicopter had not violated any laws or regulations and did not cause a disturbance).  And litigants, 
perhaps unaware of the Marks rule, or perhaps hoping to exploit the confusion surrounding it, routinely 
cite one opinion or the other as controlling authority.  See, e.g., Van Strum v. Lawn, 927 F.2d 612, *4 
(9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision) (summarizing the State’s argument, which was predicated 
entirely on the reasoning of the plurality opinion from Riley).  A third group of circuit court decisions, 
perhaps recognizing the uncertainty as to the binding precedent, also avoid an application of the Marks 
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To recap, then, since the plurality decision was issued in 1989, not a 
single lower federal court has so much as attempted to apply the Marks 
rule so as to discern the binding precedent from the Riley plurality.  Lower 
courts have mixed and sometimes combined the reasoning of the two 
opinions supporting judgment without any explanation for why one 
opinion or rationale might be more or less precedential than another.  And 
yet, the Supreme Court has not intervened to provide guidance in the more 
than two decades since Riley was handed down.  Lower courts considering 
the Riley precedent could, quite reasonably, conclude that the Court has 
left it for them to decide, a flexibility of result that the Marks rule would 
not, on the face of the opinion, permit.  Assuming the Court is not likely a 
feckless or helpless victim of its own Marks precedent leads almost 
inevitably to the conclusion that the narrowest grounds formula represents 
a form of acoustic separation.  
A second illustrative example of the problems plaguing lower court 
considerations of plurality precedent is Missouri v. Seibert,
288
 a case 
addressing the scope of Miranda protections.
289
  Since the plurality was 
handed down in 2004, the federal circuits have cited the case more than 
130 times.
290
  Of those approximately 130 decisions, only 25 cite or refer 
to the Marks rule.  
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment in Seibert and, 
perhaps anticipating the controversy that would engulf attempts to discern 
the decision’s precedent, explicitly credited his concurrence with applying 
a “narrower test.”291  That is to say, Justice Kennedy appears to have 
attempted to declare his opinion, joined by only one other Justice, binding 
precedent under Marks.    
The effort seems to have been fairly successful insofar as the vast 
majority of the lower courts that have applied Marks to Seibert have 
declared Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as the “narrowest grounds.”292  
But even in the face of a Justice describing his opinion as narrower, not all 
lower courts agree as to which opinion is truly the narrowest.  Even with 
                                                                                                                          
rule but apply both the rule set forth in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and the reasoning of the 
plurality opinion. United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 434 (4th Cir. 2002). 
288 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
289 Id. at 604. 
290 A Shepard’s Report compiled on November 8, 2012 showed that federal circuits have 
positively “followed” Seibert 146 times.    
291 Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
292 See, e.g., United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 668 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the 
Kennedy standard when no Miranda rights were read); United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1142–43 
(8th Cir. 2006) (holding a written confession to be excluded under the Kennedy formulation); United 
States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Kennedy opinion only 
allows an inquiry into two-step interrogations deliberately used as a means to subvert Miranda); United 
States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Kennedy standard is the rule for 
determining a Miranda violation). 
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guidance from the narrowest decision declaring itself to be precedential, 
some lower courts balk at the apparent infringement on their ability to 
innovate.   
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has applied the Marks rule to 
Seibert and explicitly rejected the conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence is the narrowest grounds.
293
  The panel of three judges 
concluded that “[a]lthough Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote 
for the majority, we find it a strain at best to view his concurrence taken as 
a whole as the narrowest ground on which a majority of the Court could 
agree.”294  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has observed that there is a reasoned 
basis for refusing to regard Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as the 
“narrowest grounds” for the Court’s holding. 295  Even the Supreme Court, 
when applying the Seibert precedent has avoided citing Marks, or 
conclusively defining Justice Kennedy’s opinion as announcing the 
holding.
296
   
In sum, lower courts do not appear to afford plurality precedent the 
same respect and faithful application as majority decisions.  Pluralities are 
cited less favorably, and when they are relied upon there appears to be 
greater disagreement as to their meaning and application.  Lower courts 
seem to understand that the Marks rule need not be applied as rigidly as the 
decision itself suggests; instead, there is reasonable room for innovation 
and flexibility on the part of lower courts applying plurality decisions.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When a difficult question of plurality interpretation is at issue—that 
is, when the Marks rule has critical application—the rule does not provide 
meaningful guidance to lower courts.   For decades, judges and lawyers 
have been pulling their hair out trying to make the narrowest grounds test 
more determinate.  This Article, however, maintains that the greatest virtue 
of the Marks rule may be its indeterminacy.  When the Supreme Court fails 
to achieve a majority rationale, the issue is likely to be one of particular 
complexity or political salience, and to afford non-majority reasoning the 
status of supreme law will, in certain instances, prove misguided.  And yet, 
                                                                                                                          
293 United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2009). 
294 Id. (concluding that Marks does not apply so as to create any precedent in this context).   
295 Notably, in its most recent case addressing the issue, the Tenth Circuit simply refused to 
answer the question as to which opinion is the narrowest grounds.  United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 
454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Determining the proper application of the Marks rule to Siebert 
is not easy, because arguably Justice Kennedy’s proposed holding in his concurrence was rejected by a 
majority of the Court. . . . [But t]his case does not require us to determine which opinion reflects the 
holding of Seibert.”).    
296 See Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 31–32 (2011) (per curiam) (“Under Seibert, . . . significant 
break in time and dramatic change in circumstances created ‘a new and distinct experience,’ ensuring 
that . . . unwarned interrogation did not undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.”).  
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for the Court to simply hold that in these compelling cases there is no 
precedent, would in the reasoned view of many scholars, erode the 
credibility of the Court. 
The Marks formula, then, strikes the right balance through acoustic 
separation.  The plain language of the Marks decision communicates to the 
public a confidence-preserving message that even non-majority decisions 
create binding precedent.  But the technical, legalistic narrowest grounds 
formula, particularly as applied by the Court, seems to generate an 
opposing rule of legal flexibility that discerning lower courts and lawyers 
can embrace.  As applied to lower courts, Marks spurs a dialectic 
jurisprudence that does not treat Supreme Court pluralities as the final or 
conclusive word on a legal issue.  There is an external rule fit for public 
consumption, and there is an internal rule masked in legalese.  In this way, 
the doctrine should be celebrated as achieving equilibrium between public 
expectations and pragmatic judicial decision-making principles.  The 
narrowest grounds test leaves courts refreshingly free to innovate, 
experiment, and generally facilitate the sort of percolation that is 
appropriate as to issues that fractured the Supreme Court, but it does so 
without eroding public confidence in the Court.  Public legitimacy and 
legal flexibility are generally in tension, but through acoustic separation 
the Marks rule is able to effectively reconcile these competing interests.  
 
